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Perspective changes in freight transport  
between Europe and the emerging countries 
 
Introductory speech to the 46th ISTIEE Conference 
 
 
The 46th ISTIEE conference - held in Trieste on June 6-10, 2005 and entitled 
“Perspective changes in freight transport between Europe and the emerging countries” – 
focused on the main transport corridors and their role in a globalised economy. The 
recent emergence of new productive poles, particularly in Asia, strengthened the 
integration of markets and spurred an increase in traffic for all modes of transport.  
Transport and logistics play a decisive role in a globalised economy, supporting the 
productive effort of firms located in dispersed and varied areas and satisfying diffused 
and large consumption needs. 
All modes of transport are required to contribute and both the infrastructural and 
operating aspects are relevant, not to mention issues connected to energy, safety and 
environmental aspects. 
There is no doubt that the international scenario is rapidly changing thus inducing a 
change in past conceptual schemes: there is no such a thing as a narrow, developed area 
of the world and a poor, undeveloped one. There are mature economies, struggling to 
maintain their wealth, surrounded by a multitude of countries which aim to rapidly catch 
up, showing surprising growth rates. Whether such countries are located in the Asian 
continent or not is just a contingency, since in the not far future similar cases will 
appear in South America or Africa. 
Today’s challenge is between countries, presently lagging behind that knowingly 
strive to catch up and countries that try to defend their privileged but lack a clear vision 
on how to do it. Within such a framework actions are taken that rapidly modify the 
existing productive setup via delocalization processes searching to regain 
competitiveness and conquer new markets. 
Within such a dynamic (to say the least) contest, the transportation sector plays a 
decisive role, as in many other instances in the human history. Today’s role is possibly 
even more crucial and determinant because of the globalised structure of the world 
production systems. 
As it was often the case, maritime transport plays a central role. In the last years of the 
XX century and in the beginning years of the new century, maritime transport showed 
an extraordinary evolution both in terms of goods transported and, especially, in the 
structural change of the industry obtained via mergers and acquisitions which confirms 
and strengthens the oligopolistic setup of the market. 
In effects, few shipping companies play a dominant in the market, and not only in the 
maritime market, since their influence extends well beyond the port activities to 
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encompass the modal integration processes enabled by the increasing reliability on the 
container technology. 
In parallel to the rapid development of maritime transport, ports enhanced their 
activity levels. Some ports more than others benefited from the growth trends thanks not 
only to their structural and locational characteristics but also to the fact of being chosen 
by powerful shipping companies able to make the fortune or the misfortune of a port. 
The issue of port development is a central one since it influences the definition of the 
intercontinental maritime transport routes. Such routes are complemented by the 
terrestrial transport routes meaning road and rail transport, expect the privileged case in 
which the inland navigation option is available. 
Various issues are still to be solved in the terrestrial leg of the main international 
routes, both relative to the infrastructure and to the operations. In the short term and 
considering the rapidly increasing transport demand, the operations represent the central 
issue. This determines the present focus on logistics as a useful tool, together with 
innovation, to face the competitive pressures derived by cheap labour costs. In the long 
run, the infrastructural projects need to be completed. Their ambitious goals are not 
supported by adequate funding and strongly opposed on environmental grounds. 
In such a briefly summarised perspective it is easy to forecast that for quite some time 
road transport will bear the burden of most of terrestrial transport. It is hence important 
to seek solutions to restrain its main economic and environmental adverse effects. The 
papers presented to the conference will hopefully clarify many of the aspects so far 
briefly mention. In an historical contingency which poses serious doubts on the 
constitutional premises of the European Union, an effort, non only at the infrastructural 
level, aiming at improving and developing the connection among goods and people 
within the Union, can help support the European integration process. ISTIEE (Institute 
for the Study of Transport in the European Economic Integration) was created – when 
the European Economic Community comprised 6 member states – because colleagues 
and citizens, with good farsightedness, believed in the historical, political, economic 
and social importance of an integrated Europe. Within this tradition, we continue to 
believe in the European dream and work to realise a coherent European transport policy.  
 
The present issue includes the papers by G. Giannopoulous, M. Doubrovsky and D. 
Cazzaniga presented at the 46th Istiee Conference.  
 
Giacomo Borruso, Editor-in-chief 
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Main transport challenges in South Eastern Europe, 
after enlargement 
 
G. A. Giannopoulos1∗ 
 
1Hellenic Institute of Transport, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper looks at the main challenges that are facing the Transport sector in the countries of S. E. 
Europe after enlargement. First, it looks at the challenge of setting a common Transport policy and points 
as priority areas the questions of: frontier crossings, road transport quotas, working hours (road transport), 
restructuring of railways, promotion of Rail Freight “Freeways”, new financing schemes through Public 
Private Partnerships, and other issues.  
Then it looks at the factors that will determine the future transport outlook of the area in both 
qualitative and quantitative terms and it finds that there is a web of factors and issues that will play a role, 
such as for example the socio-political climate and preferences, the advent of New Technologies, and the 
degree of development of the Trans-European Networks.  
The paper looks at the “challenges” facing the inter-urban and urban transport separately. As regards 
the first it concludes that a) higher integration of the transport provider into the whole transport and 
logistics chain, and b) closer co-operation and “integration” with the customer, will be the main ones, 
while for urban transport the main challenge will be improvement of urban traffic management systems 
and, inevitably, demand management measures, as well as implementation and operation of a whole new 
series of technologies and systems of urban ICT that will form the Integrated Urban ICT environment of 
the future.  
 
Keywords: Transport policy; South East Europe; Urban transport; Enlargement. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Enlargement has been celebrated as the major development in European affairs of 
that last decade. In many ways this defines profound changes in all fields of economic 
and social life in these countries , and raises many positive expectations to the 
population. Transport, being an activity that supports all faces of every day life, is 
bound to be affected in many ways by the new socio-economic and political (in the 
sense of policy making) environment.  
The Transport Policies adopted by the European Union and, consequently, by the 
governments of all new member states, are characterised by the on-going “full and 
                                                 
∗ Corresponding author: G. Giannopoulos (ggian@certh.gr) 
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unconditional” liberalisation process in European transport markets. At the EU 15 level 
the move, back in 1992, towards the EMU and the Single Market has eliminated 
practically all restrictions and transport-related barriers, and created a totally new 
environment under which international Transport operates. As new countries become 
members and others are aspiring to do so, within the first decade of 2000, the challenges 
for realising and operating a coherent network of Transport infrastructures and services 
are becoming both more complex and varied.  
If we define the South East of Europe a bit broadly, it includes at least 4 of the 10 new 
member states (that have joined the EU in 2002). These are Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
and Malta. Two more countries of the South East (Bulgaria and Romania) are expected 
to join in 2007-8. That practically, leaves currently out of the EU only the former 
Yugoslav Republic countries (except Slovenia of course), Turkey, and Albania. These 
latter countries, however, are indeed also strongly influenced by EU policy because they 
all aspire to become members and, of course, by their very proximity to member states.  
In this paper we will examine the challenges that face all countries of the South East 
in the field of transport as a result of the recent or expected enlargement of the EU. At 
first we look upon the all too important common policy measures that will have to be 
taken at regional (and national) level in order to form a common transport policy for the 
region, and comply with the overall EU transport policy guidelines. Then we examine 
the challenges that are associated with the increasing traffic volumes, the changing 
structure of the markets, and the associated organisational, institutional, and societal 
changes that will make the materialisation of any measures likely to occur in the near 
future, successful. 
 
 
2. The challenge of setting common transport policies  
 
2.1 Aims and issues 
 
Practically every Eastern and South Eastern European government today has adopted 
the very strategic notions of “privatisation” (for the supply of transport services), 
liberalisation of transport markets, and decentralisation of decision-making in the field 
of transport. Furthermore they have all basically accepted the principles and main axes 
of the common EU transport policy published with the White paper of 2001 (EC, 2001).  
Acceptance of these principles does not, however, invalidate the urgent need for the 
adoption of a common “regional” transport policy that would address the specific issues 
and problems facing the South East of Europe. Just as each national government adopts 
its own national transport policies that correspond to the specific issues and needs of the 
country concerned, we need a regional common transport policy that would address the 
problems and needs of transport in the wider area of South East Europe.   
To mention just a few of the most important areas in which such a regional transport 
policy is necessary, the following can be listed.  
 
• Frontier checks for road and rail passenger and freight transport crossing from 
one country to another. These checks are of paramount importance for the ease 
of movement in the region as delays in crossing borders constitute a very 
substantial portion of travel times today (SETREF, 2002 and Stoyanov, 2005).  
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• Abolition or drastic reduction of all quotas in (basically) road transport. This 
point is directed basically to all the countries of the South East that are not 
members of the EU. As more and more countries are becoming members of the 
EU, the point looses much of its significance for obvious reasons. 
• Adoption of common rules for the working hours and conditions of road 
transport harmonised with the EU regulations in this field. This is of paramount 
importance and should form the basis for any attempt to apply in practice a 
common policy that would allow for competition between the modes on equal 
terms. It is especially needed in connection to specific measures to change the 
modal split in favour of the railways. 
• Separation of rail infrastructure from railway services operation - liberalisation 
of rail services. This is a decided policy for all EU members. It will bring more 
competition in the railways. However, its universal application to all countries in 
the region would enhance the function of the (transport) market and make 
international rail travel services more competitive. 
• Promotion of the concept of the Trans European Rail Freight Freeways 
(TERFFs) in South Eastern Europe. The movement of freight by railways is an 
area where a common transport policy for the region could find an immediate 
application. The concept is already applied in central European corridors. Its 
application along, for example, axes number X and IV in the South East would 
be particularly advisable and should be looked at by way of priority. 
• A more “localised” application of the concept of Private Public Partnerships for 
the financing of Transport infrastructure in the South East. In other words, to try 
and find some variations of this concept more applicable to the socio-economic 
and business environment of the South East European countries. The experience 
of countries like Greece, where the concept was applied very successfully in the 
last 10 years (especially during preparation for the Athens Olympics of 2004), 
should be analysed and lessons learned.  
• Establishment of common licensing and safety standards in air transport. There 
can be no better demonstration for the content of such action, than the recent 
safety precautions taken by some central European countries, most notably 
France, in respect to the licensing for operation of certain airlines which do not 
meet some common safety standards (in this case those set and required by the 
French government). These moves followed the recent air accidents in Europe 
(Helios airlines, and others).  
• Elimination of National quota restrictions in maritime transport. Maritime 
transport should follow all other modes of transport in getting true liberalisation 
from any quotas and restrictions. Current policies of certain countries in the 
South East to restrict maritime traffic should be abolished.  
• Adoption of common, more liberal rules concerning cabotage in road and air 
transport. This would mean the actual elimination of cabotage in practice. It 
could take place gradually but it is something that has to be stated clearly from 
the beginning.  
 
The same regional transport policy would also address the very important issues of 
transport related environmental costs of transport, and of the ways for compensating for 
the use of transport infrastructures of one country by the vehicles registered in another. 
This issue has kept for a number of years (perhaps decades) the discussion going for a 
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variety of measures such as road pricing and other policies (EC, 1996b) not only at 
South Eastern European level but at European level as well.  
 
 
2.2 The factors that will determine success  
 
Success in formulating and, even more so, implementing a common Transport Policy 
for the region of South Eastern Europe, will depend on a number of factors the most 
important of which are: 
On the demand side: 
1. The current socio-political environment: this environment is a primary factor of 
success especially when considering the non-EU member countries. In a period 
of rapid technological change and political upheavals, a stable and market 
oriented but nevertheless with all reasonable social sensitivities and reflections, 
socio-economic environment is a desired prerequisite. The author is of the 
opinion that in the long term, the unfettered action of market forces may very 
well lead to disturbances and unwanted distortions that will have to be tackled 
by some form of re-regulation in the field of transport. So, the prevailing socio-
political environment will be the unconditional prerequisite of a monitoring and 
corrective force in any policy implementation  
2. The prevailing value systems: shifts in societal values seem to be occurring now 
which put greater emphasis in the satisfaction of individual rather than collective 
desires. Such a shift, if continued, will obviously have direct implications for all 
kinds of transport, in terms of the proliferation of lifestyle choices and the 
growth of new forms of consumption and leisure. At the same time, there is also 
evidence of growth in environmental or `green' value systems, the generalisation 
of which will also have profound implications for future transport. 
3. New methods of production organisation: new forms of flexible, lean, `just-in-
time' production are been implemented, all over Europe (and in the South East) 
to meet changing customer requirements and expectations. These are taking 
place a1ongside a clear trend towards “globalisation”, which in the European 
context is expressed by the formation of a single European-wide  production 
system. These new forms of production organisation impose quantitatively and 
qualitatively different requirements upon the freight transport system, with 
genera1 increases in the frequencies of movement, in the distance over which 
movement takes place, and in the required reliability of transport systems. 
4. New forms of spatial organisation: developments in transport and 
communications have facilitated the emergence of complex forms of spatial 
organisation, in which much greater integration across space has taken place. 
Such integration can be seen at a variety of scales, including cities and rura1 
areas, cores and peripheries within national territories and between countries at 
the European scale. More than 80% of the European population (65% in the 
South East) now lives in medium to large sized urban areas (EC 1996a). 
 
On the supply side: 
1. Development of a coherent network of Transport infrastructure in the South 
East. The notion of the Trans European – Transport Networks (TEN-Ts) that 
incorporates European wide road, rail (both high-speed and conventional), 
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maritime, inland water, and Intermodal networks, is the leading effort at the 
level of the European Union, in developing such infrastructure. Other countries 
are following. The process of development is slow and requires funding far 
beyond what can be made available by governments alone. So, relatively “new” 
forms of financing through private, or public – private partnerships must be 
tested that are especially suited for the conditions prevailing in the South East.  
2. New technological possibilities: These technologies affect primarily the 
“supply” but may also affect the “demand” for transport. The use of Information 
– Communication Technologies (ICT), i.e. the use of telecommunications and 
computing, is transforming the transport scene all over Europe and has created 
possibilities for greater integration of systems and services.  
3. At the organisational level, significant factors of success are the way in which 
transport companies are organised and co-operate. Various mergers and 
acquisitions are increasingly seen in the South East too, as important ways of 
minimising the costs of transport supply and increasing profit margins. As a 
result, transport supply is becoming more integrated and “globalised” in both 
freight and passenger transport. 
 
 
3. The challenges as regards the quantity of transport 
 
In terms of volumes of transport that are likely to materialise in the coming decades, 
in South East Europe all indications point to the fact that economic, social, 
organisational and spatial trends are bringing about a highly mobile society very much 
along the same lines as the rest of Europe. By some EU estimates, characteristically 
used in support of the TEN-T policies (EC, 1997), freight transport demand as a whole 
in the 15 original EU member states is expected to nearly double by 2010 as compared 
to 1995 (15 years). For the 10 new member states the same demand is expected to grow 
at an average rate of 7% per year. Cross border traffic in the EU of 25 is expected to 
grow by 3-4% per year over the next decade. By 2010 (as compared to 2000) there will 
be approximately 30% more passenger cars and 20% more trucks in circulation (EC, 
2001). 
The relative share of transport modes in the total inland transport work will continue 
to be dominated by road transport. Over the last 20 years or so, policies have failed to 
halt the “onslaught” of road transport in dominating both freight and passenger 
transport. The current trends show that, in the 15 original EU countries, over the last 20 
years road transport has increased its share (in total inland ton-kms), from 50% to 70% 
in freight, and from 76% to 80% in passenger transport (EC, 2001). These increases 
have been made to the detriment of rail and inland waterways, the first reduced from 
28% to 15% in freight and from 10% to 7% in passenger volumes, and the second 
accordingly. For the new member states in the Eastern Europe similar trends have been 
observed during the past 15 years (since the change in the political and economic 
system). Rail transport is in decline and road in steep increase, although the share of rail 
in the total transport work is still more than double that the one observed in western 
European countries.  
The previous figures do not include Short Sea Shipping (SSS), which if added, will 
change these percentages somewhat, but not the overall picture.  
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There is very little indication of the magnitude of intermodal transport in the statistics, 
a fact that reflects their relative low magnitude in the overall inland transport work, 
today, as well as differences and difficulties in their definition. The actual figures are 
“impeded” in the above ones, but a safe estimate would be that intermodal (in the true 
sense of the word, i.e. as defined in the existing EU legislation) accounts for a mere 3-
5% in freight transport, and something more in passenger. 
If we take GDP per capita, and the level of industrial production as two factors that 
almost directly determine freight transport demand, then the prospects are that transport 
demand will increase much faster in South Eastern Europe than in the rest of the 
European Union. Thus, as the prospects for industrial development of the less developed 
European regions of the South East are increasing, the volume of (freight) transport will 
also develop at stronger rates along certain South Eastern European corridors. 
Table 1 shows the past and (expected in the) future indicators for GDP and Industrial 
Production across Europe. As shown there, towards 2010, and perhaps further beyond, 
higher growth rates of GDP and industrial production are expected in the Southern and 
Eastern European countries as compared to the Western ones. Therefore, the rates of 
increase of freight transport flows are likely to be much higher in these areas of Europe 
than elsewhere, thus “moving” the bulk of inland freight, geographically, from western 
to a central, and south, south – easterly direction. 
At the same time, a shift is likely to occur, in the logistics chain that brings today 
most of the raw materials and containers, that support industrial production and 
consumption, through the large ports of Western Europe (Antwerp, Rotterdam, 
Hamburg, Havre). More and more of these materials in the future, may well reach their 
final destinations via the Southern – South Eastern ports such as Gioia Tauro, Taranto, 
Pireaus, Thessaloniki, or the main ports of the Black sea. This will result in an 
additional shift in the connecting inland freight transport towards these areas. 
On the same line of arguments, we should note that between 1990 and 2003, the 
former Eastern European block of countries, became the 3rd most important trading 
partner of the European Union, after Asia and North America. In the five year period 
1995 and 2001, exports of goods from the EU to Eastern European countries and the 
former Soviet Union countries, increased by almost 50% in value, while at the same 
period the total exports of the EU increased by only 11% and the imports by 5%. 
Similarly, during the same period, the former Eastern block has become very 
depended on Western Europe, with 70% of all its imports and 60% of all its exports 
directed to Western European countries. In the first half of the new century these trends 
were somewhat distorted mainly due to continued situation in Yugoslavia and the 
downturn of the economy in Russia. However, these events were of a temporary nature, 
and today they are up again indicating the future overall trends and prospects for the 
coming years. 
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Table 1: Industrial production (IP) and GDP indicators in European regions (1970=100). 
 IP GDP 
 1980 1985 1995 2010 1980 1985 1995 2010 
Western 
Europe 
126 133 158 180 132 143 175 190 
Eastern  
Europe 
130 140 90 170 120 130 105 160 
Southern 
Europe 
173 192 215 245 153 167 225 260 
Europe 
(W+S) 
129 137 165 200 134 145 175 200 
USA 139 159 198 250 132 151 190 215 
Note: “Eastern” Europe means the countries of former Eastern European block. “Southern” Europe means 
the southern countries of EU (Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece), “Western” Europe means the non 
southern countries of EU. Source: Eurostat, 2001-2002. 
 
4. The challenges as regards the quality of transport services 
 
4.1 Inter-urban transport 
 
As the level of traffic flows in the inter-urban traffic corridors goes up, so will the 
demands for more “quality”. There are a number of reasons that point in that direction: 
1. the need for more “quality” in transportation goes hand-in-hand with the 
evolving changes in production and consumption methods and work 
organisation; 
2. the realisation that transport infrastructure provision will practically never catch 
up with demand, thus leaving a lot to be improved via other means. These other 
means include: demand and traffic management actions, or wider application of 
new technologies, more integrated logistics chains management, and other “soft” 
rather than “hard” types of actions; 
3. the wider application and observance of environmental controls and restrictions 
in the operation of freight transport by land.  
The process by which transport services will evolve in the new member states is likely 
to be characterised by a series of (short-term) cycles i.e.: 
• “Growth”, represented by increased volumes of transport, but also increased use 
of new technological infrastructure in telematics and new technologies, new 
organisation methods and advanced logistics, and to some extend development 
of new physical infrastructure; 
• “Equity”, i.e. wider availability and use of the higher quality services by an ever 
increasing number of small and medium sized “users”; and  
• “Environmental” awareness, with environmental restrictions, incentives for 
higher use of intermodal transport, and “green” types of vehicles and modes.  
The overall result of these “cycles”, as we move towards the horizon of 2020, is 
hopefully (and likely too) to be a South-European inter-urban inland transport system 
that is: 
• More multi-modal; 
• “Heavy” user of transport ICT applications; 
• Producing more market induced quality; 
• Widely available to small and medium sized users; and  
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• More environmentally compatible.  
In the freight transport business environment more specifically the following may be 
true as the future most important challenges in the South East:  
a. Higher integration of the transport provider into the whole supply logistics 
chain. Supply chain management will be the higher order level of management 
into which transport will be integrated as one of a series of other supply chain 
management functions such as order management, inventory control, warehouse 
control, etc (Giannopoulos, 1996). 
b. Closer co-operation and “integration” with the customer. This will necessitate 
more intensive use of information and telecommunication technologies in order 
to support the large amounts of information flows movement that will be needed 
between firms and spatially diffused customers (Giannopoulos, 2001). It is clear 
that with the relocation of service and manufacturing activities in space, that is 
expected in the new and enlarged Europe of the future (as per our previous 
discussion and assumptions), freight transport firms will need a constant flow of 
information, both horizontally (i.e. between firms and customers) and vertically 
(i.e. within the company).  
So, the most compelling forms of policy action that would follow from the above 
would be:  
• Support to the development of advanced international transport infrastructure 
and data communications networks, to enhance the operation of the future 
freight (as well as other) transport system. The importance of national territorial 
transport infrastructure systems will gradually dissolve in the future. 
• Adoption of competition rules and guidelines, both within a mode and between 
modes of transport, so as to avoid distortions to competition and monopolistic 
situations. The foreseen types of operator companies discussed above, that 
would in any case be compatible with market mechanisms, should be 
“protected” and “accepted” within the overall transport policy.  
• Facilitation of the development of integrated logistics services which take 
account into all modes of transport and thus give multimodal transport a fair 
chance of being selected. 
• Induce greater concern and “promotion” of the interests of the final, end-user, in 
the transport service provision. 
 
 
4.2 Urban transport   
 
The increase of long distance, inter-city, transport movements will be accompanied, 
by also an increase in short-distance movement for both passengers and freight, mainly 
in urban areas. As the funds and space for more urban transport infrastructure become 
scarcer, urban freight transport in the Europe of the future will have to rely more and 
more on two areas of improvement:  
• the development of electronic aids to help improve the operation and 
exploitation of urban transport, especially freight and distribution networks,  
• urban traffic management systems to help optimise the urban traffic flow.  
Technologies for dynamic, on-line Urban Traffic Management (UTM) are likely to 
see widespread application in urban areas across South-Eastern Europe. Urban transport 
will benefit from the creation of a whole new `environment' in which the urban traffic 
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system is expected to operate in the future. It will aim to ensure the most efficient and 
productive use of the available space for the movement of people and goods .  
 
 
4.3 “Mobility” in rural areas  
 
On the whole, the socio-economic and spatial development of rural regions in the new 
member states is likely to follow the example of Western European countries becoming 
to a diminishing extent based on the economic activities of these areas, and increasingly 
so on the role of the countryside as a “compensation” area for urbanised society. 
Consequently, rural areas will increasingly become destinations of more and more 
transport movements, and will acquire more and more the transport needs of urbanised 
areas.  
The need for improving transport services to rural areas, in the new member states in 
the future, will be posed much more strongly than today. Any improvements there will 
materialise alongside with improvements to freight transport services for urban and 
inter-urban areas.  
There are two distinctive differences between rural and other areas, as regards their 
potential for improving transport.  
1. The quality of rural telecommunications networks, is generally far behind of that 
of urban areas or of the networks that connect them (inter-urban). Improvement 
therefore of the rural telecommunication networks is a necessary precondition 
for the utilization of the rural areas’ potential in development. 
2. In rural areas, “upgrading” (transport) demand is an essential element in 
successful implementation of comprehensive freight transport services. In rural 
areas, the end-users are even more “critical” to the operation of the whole 
system. Thus improvements in social infrastructure, especially in “education” to 
help individual end–users become more and more acquainted with the modern 
technologies that are (to be) employed by freight transport, is an important 
factor.  
Considering the wider socio-economic importance of keeping our rural areas “alive” 
and “attractive” for people to live there, away from the big urban areas, the above points 
take up special importance. Improving transport services to these areas should well be a 
primary goal of the policies of the future.   
 
 
5. Conclusions  
The first realisation, concerning the future South Eastern European challenges in the 
field of transport after enlargement, is that a common “regional” Transport policy must 
be agreed upon and implemented by the governments of the area. Such “regional” (i.e. 
for the South East) transport policy should address issues like the facilitation of 
transport through borders, coordinated infrastructure development along the major 
transport axes in the region, liberalisation of transport within the region, priority to 
railway and multimodal (combined) transport services, etc. 
The importance but also the difficulties of achieving a “regional” transport policy in 
the South East cannot be underestimated. Past experience teaches us that achieving 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 30 (2005): 3-13 
 12
consensus and political agreement is perhaps the most difficult and time consuming part 
of implementing change and innovation in the transport sector.  
This must be seen in conjunction with the author’s basic position that the current 
period of intense deregulation and privatisation is likely to be followed by some kind of 
return to regulation and more government involvement. The overriding issues that will 
make this necessary could be the need to preserve the environment or secure some 
minimum level of safety and social equity and public service. After all, basic economic 
and social history teaches us that all human behaviour, preferences, and trends have a 
periodical nature and real life progresses in cycles.  
A second major conclusion is that transport and traffic volumes in this region of South 
East Europe will in all evidence increase, both overall and within certain modes 
(notably road and maritime), in a much greater pace than for the rest of Europe. The 
current predominance of road transport will continue to exist in the coming decades. 
The big challenge is to retain the percentage of railway traffic which currently is much 
higher than for the rest of Europe especially in the original 15 EU member states. This 
issue needs urgent attention by all governments in the area. What is needed is that rail 
investment in real terms is at least maintained stable, and where possible increased, and 
at least for certain corridors rail must be upgraded to present a credible and challenging 
alternative to road. This will also have to entail use of rail as the basis for more 
multimodal transport services in the area.  
As regards quality of transport services, the big challenge is to create a transport 
supply system able to provide more market induced quality. This, according to the 
experience of western European counties, would need to be: 
• more multi-modal; 
• “Heavy” user of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs); 
• Widely available to small and medium sized users; and  
• More environmentally compatible.  
The South East European inter-urban transport environment of the coming decades 
must be characterised by:  
a. higher integration of the transport provider into the whole transport and logistics 
chain; 
b. closer co-operation and “integration” with the customer. This will be achieved 
through more intensive use of information and telecommunications technologies 
in order to support the large amounts of information flows and data that will be 
needed between firms and spatially diffused customers. 
Urban transport will be dominated by developments in urban traffic management 
systems. The first will be the result of the combined implementation and operation of a 
whole new series of technologies and systems of urban ICT that will form the Integrated 
Urban ICT environment of the future.  
At the same time, rural areas will increasingly become destinations of more and more 
transport movements, and will acquire more and more the needs of urbanised areas as 
far as the distribution of goods and freight transport services is concerned.   
As we therefore look to the future of transport in South East Europe, in all countries 
of the area after six of them become new member states of an enlarged EU, we can see 
many challenges and opportunities as well as the market application of a number of 
technological breakthroughs that will radically change the way transport is performed in 
these countries today. At the same time we hope that the delicate social and political 
issues associated with these new realities will be also solved soon, and that the 
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governments will agree to a South Eastern European transport policy that takes into 
account the special needs of the area. 
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Abstract 
 
Four of the nine international transport corridors pass through the territory of Ukraine: №3, №5, №7, 
and №9. In recent years Ukraine conducted an active policy supporting the European initiatives on the 
international transport corridors and offered variants of corridors to the European community. In the field 
of a water transport it is planned to carry out the construction of new and reconstruction of existing 
infrastructure (regarding corridors № 9; TRACECA; Baltic - Black Sea) in the main Ukrainian ports.  
The paper considers the situation in the Ukrainian waterways as a part of the international transport 
corridors. It presents an analysis of the existing situation and some planning measures. In order to 
optimize and rationally development the inland waterways and seaports of the Black Sea – Azov Sea 
region it is necessary to speed up the working out and official approval of the regional transport ways 
network. Regarding Ukrainian seaports this task is carried out within the framework of program 
TRACECA, and also by Steering Committee of Black Sea PETRA and working group on transport of the 
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. 
To connect the new members countries of EU two approaches are considered: (1) the use of the 
Danube River due to restoration of navigation in its Ukrainian part, providing an exit to the Black Sea; (2) 
the creation of new inland water-transport links providing a more rational and uniform distribution of 
freight traffics from the Central and Northern Europe (using the third largest river in Europe - Dnepr 
River running into the Black Sea). 
It is important to assess also a condition of development of transport flows in the neighboring states 
(states of European transport corridors), in particular in the Russian Federation (Big Ring Project and 
others). There are good prospects of Ukrainian waterways involvement in the system of international 
transport corridors. Some improvements of the existing structures are needed together with an optimized 
use of Ukrainian transport potential. There is a large reserve of capacity which represent a base for an 
optimistic prediction of the future Ukrainian waterways development as part of European transport axis. 
 
Keywords: European transport corridors; Inland waterways; Ukraine. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The international importance of the Ukrainian waterways can easily be grasped 
thinking about such rivers as the Danube (with the ports of Reni, Izmail and Ust-
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Dunaisk in the vicinity of its mouth) and the Dnepr (connecting the central part of the 
country including Kiev with the Black Sea). Other rivers have local importance and 
cannot affect on the international cargo turnover. 
Four of nine international transport corridors pass through the territory of Ukraine: 
№3, №5, №7, and №9. In recent years Ukraine conducted an active policy supporting 
the European initiatives on the international transport corridors and offered variants of 
corridors to the European community.  
However, in spite of the fact that some two years ago Ukraine won the first place in 
Europe on factor of transit, the degree of current use of Ukrainian transport 
infrastructure is still low. So the creation of transport axis and their existence in the 
international transport system is recognized as a priority nation-wide direction of 
development of Transport-Road-Complex (TRC) of Ukraine.  
 
 
2. Ukrainian waterways in the international aspect 
 
2.1 TRACECA 
 
In May, 1993 in Brussels an international conference put forward the idea of creating 
an international transport corridor, TRACECA, connecting the Western Europe via the 
Black sea, the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea to Central Asia,. Is has been estimated that 
TRACECA should provide a flow of 100 thousand containers a year. TRACECA is the 
most prominent international transport corridor whose development is recognized by the 
EU as the major transport task of the region. The corridor Europe - Caucasus - Asia can 
(and should) become a link with other international transport corridors. In Ukraine 
(ports of Odessa and Ilyichevsk) TRACECA incorporates to a corridor №9, in Romania 
(port of Constantza) it is connected with corridors №4 and 7, and in Bulgaria (ports of 
Burgas and Varna) TRACECA joins a corridor № 8 (Figure 1). 
 
 
2.2 Waterway the Danube – the Black Sea 
 
The following waterway sections can be considered on the Ukrainian Danube (Figure 
2): 
• Maritime Danube [port of Reni (km 172) – the Black Sea]; 
• port of Reni – port of Izmail; 
• Chilia Branch; 
• Danube – the Black Sea Canal ( Bystroe). 
There are no locks or bridges in the Ukrainian part of the Danube.  
The important problem of the creation of a new artificial waterway the Danube – the 
Black Sea was discussed in Ukraine during a number of years (earlier used channel 
Prorva became unsuitable for navigation). Several variants of the decision of this 
important and actual problem were offered. One of the most arguable points was the 
layout of the canal’s track in view of the conflict of interests to biosphere natural 
reserve in the Ukrainian delta of the Danube. Nevertheless economic realities of our 
time and modern understanding of ecological aspects of the situation suggested 
acceptance of the final decision. Its practical implementation started in mid May, 2004. 
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The first stage of the channel BYSTROE provides 3,5 km length, 85 m width and more 
than 8 m depth.  
 
Figure 1: The TRACECA corridor. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Ukrainian Danube. 
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It is possible to consider the restoration of navigation on the Ukrainian part of Danube 
delta as the transport event of the year 2004. The so called, deep-water ship course 
«Danube — Black Sea» began operation in August 2004. In spite of the fact that only 
the first turn of the construction now comes to an end, more than 300 vessels have 
already passed a restored ship course. An interesting detail is that 40 % of the vessels 
went to the Romanian ports. It, perhaps, testifies that the Ukrainian route is attractive 
not only for domestic shipping companies. For comparison one can mention that 
through the Sulina channel during the same period was used by about 200 vessels which 
means turning to the Ukrainian ship course over 35 % transit cargo traffic of the Lower 
Danube. The prospects are of almost 1 million tonnes of transit cargoes per year, 
including transportations to the Upper Danube and the Azov Sea - Black Sea region.  
The year of 2005 made clear some negative aspects related to the operation of the 
channel BYSTROE. Firstly, unexpected high level of sedimentation of channel’s 
bottom occurred; it was caused by extremely heavy rains in Reni-city vicinity. 
Secondly, lack of funds does not permit full-scale development of the next stages of the 
channel construction as well as quick restoration of the initial water depth of the first 
stage of channel creation. 
 
 
2.3 The Dnepr River and other inland waterways 
 
Another approach foresees the creation of new inland water-transport links providing 
a more rational and uniform distribution of freight traffics from the Central and 
Northern Europe. The main task of this approach is to use the Dnepr River (Figure 2). 
Dnepr, the third longest river of Europe, has great potential in the sphere of inland 
transportations. A unique advantage of Ukraine is represented by the fact that Dnepr, 
according to the international system of classification of waterways, is unique in Europe 
as a deep-water transport highway of category "E" which considerably raises its 
competitive rating. Crossing northern border of Ukraine and Belarus, Dnepr runs to the 
South in the direction to the Black Sea.  
The transport fleet, passing the Dnepr, can reach the ports of the Danube as well as of 
the Black and Mediterranean seas. Through the Sea of Azov, the Don River and the 
Volga-Don channel vessels can reach ports on the Volga River as well as on Caspian 
and Baltic seas. Since 1992 the Dnepr is open for call to foreign ships. 
In the USSR water transport arteries of Ukraine were maintained in a sufficient 
measure. At the end of the 80s — the beginning of 90s about 50 million tonnes of 
industrial cargoes were transported by river. After the disintegration of the Union, the 
next 10 years the transport volumes were reduced tens times. Nowadays, the main river 
carrier in Ukraine is the company UKRRECHFLOT. In 2004 the company’s volume on 
internal and local lines was 2,4 million tonnes. 
Nowadays between Dnepropetrovsk and Kiev the waterway is almost unused for 
navigation due to unreasonable decisions on taxation for passing the locks and for 
building railway bridges, and also due to payment for using the river water. 
The main uses of the Dnepr basin are for the transportation of rubble and sand from 
river borrow pits in such cities as Kiev, Kherson, Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk and also 
for the transportation to seaports of rolled metal and scrap metal. Transportation by 
inland waterways is most effective and justified for such types of cargoes as 
construction materials (rubble and sand), fertilizers, ore, cars. 
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There are indeed many river ports and quays along the banks of the Dnepr and 
Yuzhny Bug River. Ukraine's ten major river ports, namely those of Chernigov, Kiev, 
Cherkassy, Dneprodzerzhinsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhie, Nikopol, Novaya 
Kakhovka, Kherson and Nikolayev, used to handle up to 100 million tonness of cargo 
annually in former Soviet Union times. 
Dnepr is the only river in Ukraine provided with navigation locks. There are six locks 
along the Dnepr: 
• the Kiev lock, put into operation in 1964, is situated 972.4 km from the Dnepr 
Mouth; the lock has one chamber; 
• the Kanev lock, put into operation in 1972, is situated 810 km from the Dnepr 
mouth; the lock has one chamber; 
• the Kremenchug lock, put into operation in 1959, is situated 563 km from the 
Dnepr mouth; the lock has one chamber; 
• the Dneprodzerzhinsk lock, put into operation in 1963, is situated 441 km from 
the Dnepr mouth; the lock has one chamber; 
• the Zaporozhie lock. Zaporozhie hydro construction area has a three chamber 
lock and a one chamber lock. The three-chambers lock was originally put into 
operation in May 1933. It has been undergoing reconstruction since 1992. The 
one chamber lock was put into operation in December 1980; it is situated on the 
left bank of the river, 110-170 m southeast from the three-chambers lock; 
• the Kakhovka lock, put into operation in 1959, is situated 563 km from the 
Dnepr mouth; the lock has one chamber. 
 
 
2.4 Development of inland transport system 
 
Following the collapse of the USSR and the ensuing economic crisis, the flight of 
river tonnage going off to seek work on the Danube led to an abrupt fall in cargo 
handling at these river ports.  
As early as in 1992, Ukrainian river ports began to be operated in joint-stock 
ownership. And in 2002, already four of them, Zaporozhie, Dnepropetrovsk, Kherson 
and Nikolayev river ports were integrated into JS Ukrrichflot, which now owns a 
substantial share of these ports' stock. 
For providing of optimum use and rational development of inland waterways and also 
seaports of the Black Sea – Azov Sea region it is necessary to speed up works and 
obtain the official approval of the regional transport ways network. Regarding seaports 
this task is carried out within the framework of program TRACECA, and also by the 
working group on transport of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation. 
The annual increase in transport services in Ukraine is 4-5 %, the volumes of 
transportations of cargoes till 2005 have increased by 27 %, passengers by -2,7 %, and 
in the long term (till 2020) the forecast for increase of cargoes turnover is 1,5-2 times, 
and for passengers – 1,3-1,5 times.  
It is planned to carry out a construction of a new and reconstruction of existing 
infrastructure (regarding corridors № 9; TRACECA; Baltic - Black sea) in such ports as 
Ilyichevsk, Odessa, Yuzhny, Mariupol. 
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3. New possibilities in water transport and international corridors development 
 
3.1 From Europe to Asia by sea 
 
The situation of formation and development of the basic Black Sea communications 
may be characterized as follows. On the one hand, the rough reorganization of basic 
cargo traffic and appropriate transport communications (occurred in 90s) was replaced 
by the stabilization of trade communications, trade turnover and, as a consequence, 
certain stabilization of transport ways and transportation directions. On the other hand, 
real practice of realization of transportations and accumulation of their results for the 
period have enabled to specify the decisions, accepted at the international level, on the 
creation of transport corridors and definition of perspective transport ways. The second 
meeting of the Expert group on development of the Euro-Asian transport ways was 
devoted to these questions, which have been held in Odessa on the beginning of 
November 2004. 
It has been decided, that the further development of connections of transport axes of 
the European network with a transport infrastructure of the Black Sea region should 
include the new concept of sea intermodal lines, making transport flows more effective 
for the account of intermodal and other technical and organizational measures. At the 
meeting of BSEC Working Group on transport and the meeting of the Ministers of 
transport of the BSEC countries, which have been held in January 2005 in Thessaloniki, 
the previously considered map of the routes was complemented by a lot of the offers 
which have been brought in by the representatives of two international regional 
transport Associations BASRA and BINSA. 
The main intermodal Black Sea lines are based on ports: Ilyichevsk, Odessa, Izmail, 
Nikolaev, Kherson, Mariupol, Berdyansk and Kerch (Ukraine), Constantza (Romania), 
Varna and Bourgas (Bulgaria), Novorossiysk, Tuapse and Kavkaz (Russian Federation), 
Poti and Batumi (Georgia), Istanbul, Derince, Zonguldak and Samsun (Turkey). 
One of the largest Ukrainian ports of the region by general cargoes handling is the 
port of Illyichevsk, where two major international transport corridors of the Eastern 
Europe approach each other: Corridor №9 and TRACECA. In 2004 the total cargo 
turnover of the port was 14,8M tonnes, including 197,000 TEU of containers and 1,5Mt 
of ferry cargoes. 
In connection with the rather dynamical increasing of the flow of containers through 
the port (from 30 up to 50 % annually), the Government of Ukraine has approved the 
Program of the port development till 2010. This Program provides the increasing of 
capacity for containers handling up to 1,5M TEU per year. In the port it is conducted the 
construction of new terminals not only for general, but also for bulk and liquid cargoes. 
It should enable to increase capacity of the port (now it is 23,5M tonnes per year) more 
than 2 times in the next 10 years. 
The Odessa port now is the third in cargo traffic among the ports of the Black Sea 
region and handled 30.5 M tonnes in 2004.  
The Pan European transport corridor #9 approaches the port of Odessa, as well as the 
port of Ilyichevsk. In the port of Odessa especially the volumes of container handling 
has rapidly increased (2004 – 203.500 TEU). The rates of growth of container cargo 
traffic are from 20 up to 30 % per year. The port has one of the best passenger terminals 
in Black Sea region, and will serve as one of the main bases for development of sea 
transportations and tourism in future. 
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Together with the port Yuzhniy, located near Odessa, which specializes basically on 
bulk and liquid cargoes, the three ports of the Large Odessa' (Odessa, Ilyichevsk, 
Yuzhniy) in total have achieved a cargo traffic of more than 60M tonnes per year and 
provide a turnover more than a half of cargo traffic of the ports of Ukraine. 
One of the main port bases on the Black Sea area of the Danube (Pan European 
transport corridor №7) is the port of Izmail, located on crossing of the corridor №7 and 
Balkan branches of the transport corridor №9. 
The Ukrainian port of Mariupol, located on the coast of the Azov Sea, is the sea gate 
of the most powerful industrial raw-supplying region in Ukraine - Donbass. So in 2004 
from total port cargo traffic 4,33M tonnes have made transit cargoes. Now Mariupol is 
the basic port of transit sulphur handling in bulk from Kazakhstan. 
The significant amounts of cargo handling from the sea to overland type of transport 
the Russian ports of the Black Sea coast carry out and, first of all, two large of them: 
Novorossisk and Tuapse. The total cargo traffic of these two ports was 89.8 M tonnes in 
2004. 
 
 
3.2 Container cargo turnover and JSC UDSC activity 
 
Over two dozens of the largest container operators are working on the Black Sea. One 
can find among the carriers such companies as Maersk Sealand, CMA CGM, MSC 
ZIM, Cosco, Hapag-Lloyd, P&O Nedlloyd and others. 
The Romanian port of Constantza is the leader in container traffic (206,400 TEU in 
2004). The container cargo turnover of the port of Odessa amounted to 185,900 TEU 
and the port of Ilyichevsk transhipped 196,600 TEU in 2004. The program of increasing 
of the container traffic via Ukrainian sea ports for 2004-2007 provides for the growth of 
container handling as much as by 770,000 TEU including the growth by 350,000 TEU 
in the port of Odessa, by 250,000 TEU in Ilyichevsk, by 110,000 TEU in Mariupol, by 
50,000 TEU in Izmail, and by 10,000 TEU in Nikolaev. 
JSC UDSC (Joint Stock Company Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company) is the 
operator of Ukrainian-Turkish container line Roksolana with regular ship calls at the 
ports of Ilyichevsk, Istanbul and Izmail (optionally - at the ports of Odessa and 
Mariupol). 
The port of Izmail is located in the mouth of the river Danube where the International 
Transport Corridor No. 7 is passing. Potential possibilities of the direction increased 
after the reconstruction of the Ukrainian shipping passage the Danube - the Black Sea in 
August 2004. The main ports on the Danube handling containers are the following: in 
Germany - Deggendorf; in Austria -Vienna, Lintz; in Slovakia - Bratislava; in Serbia - 
Belgrade; in Hungary - Budapest; in Bulgaria - Rouse; in Romania - Giurgiu, and in 
Ukraine - Izmail. 
UDSC spares no efforts to increase transportation between Ukrainian ports and the 
ports of the Danube countries including the way out to the Canal Rhine - Main - 
Danube. There have already been some orders for mineral raw materials, domestic 
electric devices in containers to be transferred from the ports of industrial zone Izmir 
(Turkey) to the ports of the upper Danube. The shipping company is considering the 
possibility to establish a container line Izmail - ports of middle and upper Danube. 
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3.3 Prospects of free economic zones 
 
One can see interesting prospects in rationally combining free economic zones (FEZ) 
and the international transport corridors. According to expert assessment, combination 
of FEZ and international transport corridors in the considered region may produce a 
significant effect and create a transport artery of intercontinental value. Both the Baltic 
Sea-Black Sea corridor and the international transport corridor Europe-Asia will attract 
to Ukraine a powerful transit flows, including links between Southern Asia and Europe, 
Africa and Europe, the Middle East and Europe, Central Asia and Europe. Two FEZ are 
already created: one in Odessa Port and other – in Reni. 
 
 
 
3.4 GUAM opportunities 
 
An organization as GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) has a large 
potential in the development of the international transport corridors and waterways. In 
September 2000 during the Millennium Summit in New York leaders of GUAM 
countries have signed Memorandum and have proclaimed «a new phase of development 
of association». One of the basic items of the memorandum recognizes as an 
unconditional general priority the effective functioning of a transport corridor Europe – 
Caucuses - Asia and the necessity of developing its infrastructure, providing its 
reliability and safety. It was confirmed on the Yalta Summit (June, 6-7, 2001, Ukraine) 
and was reflected in Yalta GUAM Charter where the basic purposes, principles, 
directions of cooperation as well as organizational structure of GUAM were determined. 
 
 
3.5 Potential of BSEC 
 
During the recent meeting of the Ministers of Transport of BSEC (Black Sea 
Economical Cooperation) member countries passed the Declaration on linking the 
transport systems of the Black Sea region and European Union. As it was proposed by 
the Ukrainian representative in the Black Sea International Shipowners Association, the 
item concerning development of sea transport on the routes linking Asia and Europe via 
the Black Sea was put into it. One of the important direction of such development is 
operation of ferry crossings in the Black Sea, between Ukraine and Georgia as well as 
between Ukraine and Turkey. In December 2004 dredging works were started in 
Scadovsk Sea Commercial Port aiming to open the second passenger-and-freight ferry 
line Scadovsk — Zonguldak (Turkey). Statement of the second ferry will give 
additional increase in a stream of import - export and transit cargoes in Turkey direction 
approximately on 250-280 thousand tonnes. 
 
 
3.6 Cooperation with EBRD 
 
The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development declares its readiness 
through programs of bank to carry out attraction on the Ukrainian market up to 1 billion 
euro of investments per year. Such statement was made by the president of the 
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European Bank of Reconstruction and Development Bank Mr. Jean Limier during 
January meeting in Davos with the president of Ukraine Victor Yuschenko. At a 
meeting with journalists in Kiev the director of the European Bank of Reconstruction 
and Development in Ukraine Mr. Kamen Zakhariev has informed that in 2005 the Bank 
is going to direct to Ukraine credit resources at least for the sum 400 million USD 
whereas in 2004 the volume of investments of Bank has been at the level of 350 million. 
According to Mr. Zakhariev, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development is 
going to make active crediting projects in sphere of road construction, construction of 
ports and the airports, as well as, in railway transportation, and also in development of 
an infrastructure of cities. According to the bank, the portfolio of the Bank in Ukraine in 
2004 has increased for 267 million euro (seven new large projects are authorized). In 
total from the beginning of activity of the Bank in Ukraine 64 projects for the sum of 
1,6 billion euro are realized. As to Mr. Zakhariev opinion, despite of the certain 
negative influence rendered on economy of Ukraine by political events of the end of 
2004, its growth in the current year will make about 6,5 %. 
 
 
3.7 Sea ports rating of 2004 
 
The rating of the 20 biggest sea ports and terminals of the Black and Azov Seas of 
2004 has considerably changed if compared with that of 2003. The Russian oil port of 
the Caspian Piping Consortium (CPC) has achieved the largest growth in handling. It 
has increased oil discharging by 50.5 %, having 22.2M tonnes handled in total. The port 
of CPC has changed its position from the sixth to the fourth place and outstripped the 
port of Tuapse (Russia) and the port of Yuzhniy (Ukraine).  
In great probability CPC can be predicted to take the third place pressing out the port 
of Odessa (Ukraine) in 2005. As it was stated by Mr. MacDonald, Director General of 
CPC, they are planning to increase the amount of transshipped oil up to 32M tonnes in 
2005. Ukrainian ports of Odessa and Theodosia lost large cargo flows of transit oil in 
2004. One can hardly see any possibility of their returning yet. The port of Theodosia 
moved from 9 to 18 position in the rating of top twenty owing to those losses. JS 
Novorossiysk Sea Trade Port is the first. Its cargo turnover totaled 69.5M tonnes. 
Volumes of cargo turnover have not changed in the port since last year. The second 
place was taken by the port of Constantza, as in 2003. But that port increased its cargo 
turnover as much as by 7.2M tonnes. The growth of box handling by 87.1 % (from 
206,449 TEU up to 384,282 TEU) was the most considerable. That growth, if measured 
in tonnes, amounted to 106.4 %. That means the port additionally handled almost 2M 
tonnes of cargoes in containers. The Port Kaukaz achieved considerable cargo turnover 
due to the large volumes of oil of UKOS company transferred through the Kerch 
Straight in 2003 (over 5M tonnes) are reckoned in statistics of the port Kaukaz. 
 
 
4. Ukraine/Russia interaction in inland water transportation and corridors’ 
development 
 
For the Ukraine it is important to assess also the conditions for development of 
transport flows in the neighbouring states (states of European transport corridors), in 
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particular in the Russian Federation. It is forecast that the volume of foreign trade of 
Russia till 2010 in comparison with 1998 will increase by 70-75 %, and export-import 
transport by 30-35 %. According to experts, a cargo turnover of container cargoes on a 
direction the Western Europe - East Asia will make 250 billion dollars (10-15 % of 
them will pass by the Russian transport communications). In 2001-2010 Russia plans to 
spend 600 billion roubles for the development of corridors’ infrastructure. Thus the 
main freight traffics inside Russia will go on axes West - East and North - South. 
 
 
4.1 The concept of integration of transport systems 
 
In September 2004 the concept of integration of transport systems of Ukraine and the 
Russian Federation has been signed. Substantive provisions of this document are based 
on a joint interests of Russia and Ukraine in the sphere of formation of Common 
Economic Space (CES), assistance to social and economic progress, satisfactions of 
needs of economy of two countries in the transportation of passengers and cargoes by 
all types of transport and increases the level of integration of transport networks of the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine in world transport system. In order to provide 
implementation of the mentioned Concept in Ukraine there has been already created a 
special working group which solves problems of interaction of the parties within the 
framework of the Concept functions.  
In the frame of Conception of integration of transport systems of Ukraine and Russian 
Federation recently some new actions will be developed. These actions concern 
passenger shipment between Caspian, Azov, Black seas and Danube via inland 
waterways of Russia and Ukraine. Besides new tourist projects and joint programs of 
cruise lines will be developed. There will be also a joint Russian/Ukrainian project in 
the Port of Yuzhniy relating to the construction of coil terminal of 10 mln ton capacity. 
 
 
4.2 Transport corridor North — South 
 
During the second Euro-Asian Conference on Transport on September, 12, 2000 in 
Sankt-Petersburg the Intergovernmental Agreement on international transport corridor 
"North - South", between the Republic of India, Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
Russian Federation has been signed. Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
Bulgaria and Bahrain have declared intention to join the Agreement. Among possible 
candidates on participation are considered to be also Turkmenistan, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and some other 
countries, including European: Finland and Lithuania.  
The corridor "North - South" may include some different routes in involved regions:  
1. a Trans-Caspian Sea option; 
2. a waterway the Caspian Sea - Volga River - Baltic Sea including route to the 
Volga-Don channel and further to the Black Sea ports; 
3. a railway and automobile transportation. 
Transport between participants of the Agreement by the corridor are presently carried 
out only according to the first option. The joint-stock company "Astrakhan Shipping 
Company" was established in Russia to work on this corridor. 
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It may be foreseen that development of the second option regarding the Black Sea 
direction and well known deficit of Russian ports throughput capacity will lead to 
Ukrainian sea ports and waterways involvement in the transit transportation process. 
Existing reserves of Ukrainian sea ports throughput capacity (about 30 % for the present 
state) and their universal possibilities of cargo handling allow to consider the Ukraine as 
prospective potential partner for "North - South" corridor participants. 
On the European direction which provides transport-economic relations North - 
South, the Russian experts underline the importance of these directions:  
• Finland border – Sankt-Petersburg - Moscow - Kiev - ports of Ukraine on Black 
Sea; 
• Sankt-Petersburg - Pskov - Nevel - Vitebsk - Kiev - ports of Ukraine on Black 
Sea. 
Both routes are parts of the European international transport corridor № 9. Recently 
there were two events considered as important for realization of International Transport 
Corridor (ITC) North — South project. The first one: the Russian transport workers 
have put into service the railway 700-m long bridge over the Buzan River. The second 
one — in the Croatian town of Pula. Construction of four sea rail ferries intended to 
serve transit transportation on the Caspian Sea was launched at the Ulianik shipyard. 
The contract price of each ferry boat amounts to 20M USD.  
Taking into account the construction of the 49-km branch line to the port of Olya, 
Russia can be considered to have completed the formation of its section of that ITC. In 
the nearest future the completion of technological chain can influence seriously the 
amount of cargo traffic, transit cargo mainly. For example, container transportation 
through the ITC enable to reduce time of cargo transfer from the Northern Europe to 
India and Iran from 37 down to 13—15 days. 
The total value of the current cargo traffic in Europe — Asia range amounts to 140Bn 
USD annually. Iran declares his intention to earn additionally from 5 to 10Bn USD from 
transit of cargo. Moscow has well-grounded intention to get the same revenue in future. 
A consortium of states carrying out that project includes currently 10 countries: Russia, 
Iran, Iraq, Oman, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Syria. 
Other countries including UAE are interested in it. 
In 2003 almost 5M tonnes of container cargoes costing over 5Bn USD were 
transferred through the ITC North-South. In 2004 cargo transportation increased by 
15—20 %. In 2—3 years cargo traffic through the ITC is expected to reach annual 15M 
tonnes. Potential volumes of transit container cargo are far over 20M tonnes. To achieve 
that goal, a container terminal of 1M TEU annual capacity is under construction in the 
port of Olya. 
 
 
4.3 Transit cargo transportation 
 
The transport policy of Russia has a significant importance for Ukraine. It is enough 
to mention that 70 % of import freight traffics come to Ukraine from Russia, 65 % of 
the transit cargoes transported through the territory of Ukraine are Russian goods. Such 
cargoes as coal, oil and mineral oil, iron and manganese ore, ferrous metals, chemical 
and mineral fertilizers, grain prevail in the structure of transit. All these goods are 
Russian exports to Europe through both on-land transport and using seaports of Ukraine 
to all continents of the world. 
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Ukraine is unhappy of the fact that the share of Russia in transit cargoes transportation 
through the Ukrainian seaports is constantly reduced: from 85 % in the middle of 90s up 
to about 60 % nowadays. It is connected with a purposeful policy of Russia on 
reorientation of export-import freight traffics to own ports. 
The second major factor of the transport policy of Russia is the development of his 
own transit potential as a transport bridge between Europe and Asia.  
In December, 2001 the Government of the Russian Federation accepted the Federal 
Program «Modernization of Transport System of Russia» in which the qualitative 
updating of all types of transport and a number of inter-branch programs are 
determined. The prospective total amount of financing (in the prices of 2001) for the 
period of 2002-2010 was determined as 4646,3 billion roubles (approximately 150 
billion dollars). One of components of the Federal Program is the program 
«International Transport Corridors» determining a transit policy of Russia in the 
beginning of XXI century.  
Russia estimates the losses stipulated by transfer of cargoes to ports of the adjacent 
countries in 1 billion dollars per year. According to Russia’s, now (because of lack or 
absence of own reloading capacities) more than 25 % of the Russian foreign trade 
turnover of goods goes through ports of Ukraine, Baltic and Finland. 
In the last years the Russian oil companies have essentially reduced the transit of oil 
in a direction of Odessa, having left this route to the Kazakh companies. A further 
reduction of transit of the Russian oil through seaports of Ukraine is predicted. 
In 2001 Ministry of Railways of the Russian Federation has cancelled export railroad 
rates/taxes for the basic Russian cargoes sent to own ports thus reducing the 
competitiveness of the Ukrainian ports. 
 
 
4.4 The Big Ring project 
 
The Big Ring Project represents the development of a concrete projects of the 
Ukrainian - Russian cooperation in sphere of internal waterways. The project was 
developed by the international company “Interlighter”. It suggested that the 7th Danube 
transport corridor should be extended to Astrakhan on the Volga River in Russia. The 
Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company (UDSC) hold negotiations on the organization of 
the traffic by that route with the Russian enterprises North-West Shipping Company and 
Donrechflot. UDSC has specific proposals concerning carriage of various machinery 
from Hungary, Austria, Germany to the Caspian Sea by waterways including rivers of 
Russia. But the prices for passage through the Volga-Don Canal repel solvent 
customers. 
 
 
4.5 New railway/ferry connection 
 
In November 2004 the railway/ferry connection «Crimea - Caucasus» was opened. 
According to forecasts, it will be able to reduce the transport distance between Ukraine 
and Russia to 270 km. Besides the ferry will allow reduce cost and terms of delivery of 
cargoes. A planned turnover of goods using the ferry is established at the level of 3,4 
million tonnes per year. 
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5. The Baltic Sea –The Black Sea by waterways  
 
By present time some interesting initiatives directed on connection of the European 
countries, not having own way to the Black Sea (Poland, Baltic, Belarus), to the Dnepr 
have been offered (Figure 3). 
Let us now concentrate on some of the most, in our opinion, promising and effective 
projects. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Ukraine-Belarus-Baltic map. 
 
 
5.1 Daugava – Dnepr Project 
 
An interesting and prospective idea was recently proposed. It concerned the creation 
of a new inland transport corridor Latvia-Belarus-Ukraine by waterway Daugava – 
Dnepr. According to designers, the length of this waterway will be 2330 km. Its 
operation will provide essential increase of cargo turnover on the direction “Baltic Sea – 
Black Sea”. There are different expert evaluations of possible turnover: the low estimate 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 30 (2005): 14-36 
 27
is 10 million tons per year, more optimistic assessments forecast several times more by 
2010. 
One can expect some technical problems when constructing a new waterway. First of 
all the construction of the channel (80 km length) between the Belarus cities of Orshas 
and Vitebsk. Another important task is the improvement of the Daugava River: to make 
it navigable it is necessary to construct in Latvia at least 3 water engineering systems 
(including dams, locks, etc.). According to preliminary assessment, it is necessary to 
invest about EUR 5 billion to provide all necessary construction works; the total cost of 
the project reaches about EUR 6 billion. As it was indicated in the press, Icelandic 
investment bank Kaupthing was ready to invest required means in this project. 
According to experts evaluation it may be possible to fulfill the project during 6 years. 
 
 
5.2 Prospects on Belarus direction 
 
In connection with above-stated we would like briefly to overview situation with 
Belarus, which recently made active efforts for the development of inland waterways 
and cargo transportation by water (particularly, by sea). Since 2000 part of the Belarus 
export by waterways is carried out via Ukraine. One of the main directions is the 
transportation of potash fertilizers by inland waterways to Nikolayev Merchant Sea Port 
where they are overloaded on the sea-going vessels.  
Nowadays Belarus has a quite good cargo base. Experts estimate that freight flows 
from this country with use of sea transport exceed 15 million tonnes a year. Part of them 
are directed to the Baltic Sea, part to the Black Sea, and today between ports of the 
countries surrounding Belarus there is a serious competition for serving the Belarus 
export, namely among Kaliningrad (Russia), Ventspils (Lithuania), Klaipeda (Latvia), 
Nikolayev (Ukraine).  
Though Belarus is not a sea state, its government has accepted the program of 
development of sea transport. According to this program 10 «river - sea» type vessels 
are to be built. The vessel "Nadezhda" (“The Hope”) has already been constructed at the 
shipyard in Gomel-city. This vessel transports potash fertilizers to Nikolaev. Belarus 
authorities plan to use their fleet for work on Danube routes.  
In Belarus there is an extensive system of inland waterways: about 2000 km in length 
and 10 river ports in operation. The big role is played by the Dnepro-Bugsky channel 
which exists more than 200 years. During former Soviet times there passed up to 30 
vessels a day. Now the waterway which may participate in connecting the East and the 
West is almost abandoned. Nevertheless, if some ideas related to the linkage the Black 
Sea – the Baltic Sea will be realized, we can expect a rise of interest to this waterway 
too. First of all consider the route the Black Sea – Dnepr — Dnepro-Bugsky channel — 
Vistula — Oder — the Baltic sea which is in discussion since end of 90’s of the last 
century. This waterway is the shortest route from the Black Sea up to the Baltic Sea but 
its arrangement needs serious investments to construct or renew several locks in Brest 
(Belarus) and on the river Bug (Poland). Meanwhile in Belarus some the reconstruction 
of locks on the Dnepro-Bugsky channel according to European standard has already 
started.  
Transportation of cargoes from Belarus via Pripyat, Dnepr and Southern Bug initially 
was carried out by some Ukrainian shipping companies. Besides, there is an opportunity 
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to renew river transportation of the Belarus wood, peat, and with return loading — the 
Ukrainian rolled steel. 
In Ukraine there are all conditions to increase cargo volumes through Dnepr ports. For 
this purpose there is no need to build new expensive construction. Constructed during 
the Soviet time about 80 quay walls in all river industrial cities, six locks and more than 
thousand kilometers of equipped waterway have a sufficient reserve of throughput. 
Charges on the maintenance of inland waterways look more than attractive in 
comparison with expenses for the construction of new and the maintenance of existing 
railways and highways as well as bridges, tunnels, crossings, stations, etc. 
 
 
6. Prospects of Ukrainian water transport and sea ports development  
 
 
6.1 Water transport and inland transportation 
 
From the Soviet Union time Ukraine has inherited a powerful infrastructure of water 
transport. But ten years later there was a problem of steady ageing of the fleet. The 
average age of the steam-ships maintained by the Ukrainian shipping companies is 
approximately 24 years, and write-off of obsolete vessels exceeds ten times the 
construction of new ones. 
Shipping companies try to improve the situation. In particular, the UKRRECHFLOT 
company has received from the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
three credits for construction of new fleet. In cooperation with Eurobank seven dry-
cargo universal ships are already constructed, the design of four more steam-ships of a 
carrying capacity of 6300 tonnes each is realized. According to the building contract ten 
such vessels will be constructed. Presently the national carrier owns 200 vessels of a 
various class and purposes. 
The large industrial enterprises — steel plants, chemical factories, coal holdings for 
which work via Dnepr ports is more than justified from a territorial point of view – have 
river connections with the ports of the Black Sea. Besides, the further development of 
feeding container lines on a transport route Ilyichevsk — Odessa — Dnepr ports, in 
particular, Dnepropetrovsk and Kiev, is forthcoming. 
During the next five years, up to 2010, experts predict an increase in transport 
volumes by river transport more than 100 % in comparison with parameters of 2004. 
Thus the annual gain of a segment will reach 20-25%.  
 
 
6.2 Ukrainian sea ports - Program of development 
 
All the 19 sea commercial ports of Ukraine are state-owned (to the contrary with 
Russia where most of the ports were privatized). Basic principles of Ukrainian ports 
operation are stipulated by the Program of Development of Sea Merchant Ports of 
Ukraine till 2010 and in the Concept of Development of Transport-Road Complex of 
Ukraine till 2020.  
The main objectives of the Program are: 
• to create a reliable material base of seaports of the highest world standards; 
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• to strengthen the interaction of sea merchant ports with other adjacent types of 
transport and cargo owners in the frame of logistical systems and the 
international transport axis which pass the territory of Ukraine; 
• to increase the level of navigating and ecological safety in sea merchant ports; 
• to increase the efficiency of state regulation of activity and development of sea 
merchant ports which will provide the realization of interests of the state without 
restricting the economic independence of the enterprises. 
The basic directions of the Program contain a complex of technical-technological, 
economic and organizational – legal measures encompassing: 
• the creation and modernization of terminal complexes, the implementation of 
progressive transport-technological systems and their correspondence to the 
world standards; 
• the creation of conditions which assist increase in volumes of the international 
transit transportations through Ukrainian ports; 
• the creation and development of legal base of transport and transport-
technological providing of ports activity in interaction with other types of 
transport, harmonization of the current legislation regarding the international 
shipping laws; 
• the reform of management methods and forms of economic activities of ports 
aiming their correspondence to requirements of development of the transport 
services market and world practice of ports management by way of structural 
transformations and dividing of administrative and business functions; 
• the regulation of ports activity on state and regional (municipal) levels in view 
of their importance in the general system of economy of Ukraine, the 
international and local transport networks; 
• the creation of data bases in order to increase the competitiveness of the 
Ukrainian ports as well as providing the conditions of information and 
technological interaction and coordination of work of different types of 
transport. 
The basic program task is entering to operation in 2002-2010. The major productive 
parameter is an increase of cargo turnover in the Ukrainian seaports by 30 % (from 89 
million tons in 2001 up to 115 million tons in 2010). 
Sea commercial ports at the present stage are the basic part of sea transport of 
Ukraine. The further development of ports is supported by the “Program of stabilization 
and development of sea and river transport of Ukraine till 2005". Dynamics of freight 
flows resulted in tab.1. 
In 2004 cargo turnover amounted to 111.4 M tonnes, increasing by 0.7 % relative to 
2003. And though export has grown by 15 %, transit went down by 12.8%, primarily 
due to reduced oil and grain transit from Russia. In 2004 the sea ports of Ukraine 
handled 410,500 TEU (28 % over the 2003 result). 
The basic owner of transit cargoes is the Russian Federation (80 % of total amount of 
a transit freight flows through the Ukrainian seaports). Reloading complexes specialized 
to work with specific cargoes in ports. In some seaports new specialized complexes for 
nontraditional cargoes were recently constructed. Thus, sea commercial ports of 
Ministry of Transport of Ukraine have nowadays a reserve of a throughput capacity 
about 35 %, but it concerns mostly reloading complexes of universal purpose with crane 
kind of mechanization of reloading works. 
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Table 1: Dynamics of freight flows which pass through seaports of Ministry of Transport of Ukraine 
during 1998 - 2004.  
Parameters 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Cargoes in 
total, mln 
tonnes 
69,4 80,85 84,1 89,04 106.287 110.64 111.44 
Including:        
Liquid cargoes 17.51 25.82 
 
25.62 27.61 31.055 36.59 28.14 
Bulk and Dry-
Bulk cargoes 
cargoes cargoes 
25.24 27.80 29.50 29.50 45.10 43.92 49.47 
Boxes/Packages 23.07 27.23 28.97 27.91 30.12 30.13 33.82 
Among them:        
Export 35,1 41,0 40,0 45,27 55.31 50.19 57.69 
Import 2,1 2,4 3,0 3,53 34.78 7.13 7.02 
Transit 30,4 34,1 36,5 36,03 42.97 48.97 42.72 
Short sea 
transportation 
1,8 3,2 4,5 4,21 44.99 4.35 4.06 
 
Occurrence in sphere of the foreign trade and transit transportations of nontraditional 
kinds of cargoes, participation of Ukraine in network of international transport corridors 
has caused need of development of corresponding capacities of reloading complexes 
and infrastructures of sea merchant ports, including port railways and stations. 
Dynamics of volumes of cargoes handling in sea merchant ports of Ukraine are 
presented in tab. 2. 
 
Table 2: Cargo handling in sea merchant ports of Ukraine for the period 2002 - 2004, thousand tonnes. 
Ports 2002 2003 2004 
Odessa 28545 33496 30549 
Ilyichevsk 13830 13654 14883 
Yuzhny  13550 16126 18868 
Belgorod-Dnestrovsky 840 827 1084 
 3730 4222 5003 
Nikolaev 970 532 841 
Oktyabrsk 2400 2511 2702 
Kherson 250 323 375 
Sevastopol 3380 11114 5335 
Feodosiya 885 2268 2636 
Kerch 8000 13465 14771 
Mariupol 2450 2452 2403 
Berdyansk 4675 5631 6645 
Izmail 3160 2019 2242 
Reni 1800 622 1027 
Ust-Dunaisk 160 217.3 271 
Yalta 500 1082 1277 
Evpatoria 300 169.28 162 
Skadovsk 28545 33496 30549 
Totally 13830 13654 14883 
Ilyichevsk 87625 110661 111436 
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An important task of the Program is to harmonize the legislation with the international 
agreements and the corresponding legislation of EU. First of all the completion of 
changes and amendments to the Code of Merchant Navigation is foreseen. Development 
and approval of a package of branch legislative acts (rules, regulations, instructions), 
which comment some items of the specified law, will be worked out simultaneously.  
The reforming of state regulation will be based on the following principles: 
1. fixed capital of ports (berths, moles and breakwaters, shore protection structures, 
territories, water areas, approaching ways, reloading complexes, etc.) is state 
property and is not the subject to privatization; 
2. functions of port authorities are divided on: 
a. management of a state property and development of a fixed capital; 
b. providing of safety navigation on water areas of ports and supervision of 
safety of navigation according to laws, rules and the international 
agreements of Ukraine in the field of merchant shipping; 
c. commercial economic activities concerning service of vessels, cargoes 
and passengers; 
3. de-monopolization of industrial activity in ports is provided: a competitive 
environment is created due to functioning on their territories and water areas of 
commercial structures which compete for service of vessels, cargoes and 
passengers (stevedore, forwarding, agency and other organizations). 
The basic idea of the Program relates to stimulation of capital investments in 
construction of the specialized reloading complexes, development of railway and truck 
transportation communications due to own and involved financial resources and duly 
entering in operation according to predicted term of coming freight flow. 
Regarding Governmental decisions concerned participation of seaports in system of 
the international transport corridors, it is necessary to define in corresponding normative 
documents items on the organization of the interaction of domestic seaports with 
administration of the international transport corridors according to the international 
standards. 
During last years investment activity on sea transport was carried out by realization of 
investment projects of modernization and construction of reloading complexes in 
seaports. More than 70 % of all investments were carried out thanks to the ports’ own 
means.  
The need for the further construction of port complexes stipulated by the Concept of 
Development of Ports of Ukraine till 2020 is confirmed. The total need of investments 
till 2010 on development of port complexes of Ukraine is estimated in volume of 2,3 
billion hrn (about EUR 360 mln). Additional investments are necessary for updating of 
port fleet by tug-boats and other auxiliary vessels as well as by passenger vessels. 
Providing safety of navigation and prevention of environment pollution in sea 
merchant ports are the primary strategic directions of work of seaports of Ukraine and 
are directed to realization of a state policy in the field of protection the population, 
territories, an environment, economy against negative influence of ports activities. 
Further opportunities of development of social sphere in sea merchant ports will be 
determined by two factors: state legislation in the field of social policy and economic 
efficiency of activity of each port. 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 30 (2005): 14-36 
 32
Table 3: Volumes of necessary investments into development of Ukrainian ports (Ministry of Transport 
and Communication), mln EUR. 
Subjects of 
investments 
Volumes of investments Sources of funding 
 Including Own means, 
investments 
State budget 
 
In total for 
2002-2010 
Up 10 2005 2006-2010   
Construction 
and 
reconstruction 
of terminals 
370 213 158 370 - 
Purchasing of 
vessels 
116 47 69 52 64 
In total for all 
ports 
487 260 227 422 65 
 
 
 
7. Russian ports in 2004  
 
7.1 Some basic figures  
 
In 2004 the cargo turnover of the sea ports of Russia and neighbouring countries 
increased by 63.8M tonnes and amounted to 420Mt (+18 %). The share of Russian ports 
in total volume of transportation of Russian cargo increased by 5 % and amounted to 30 
%. The traffic of Russian foreign trade cargo via foreign ports decreased 
correspondingly and amounted to 84.4M tonnes — 57.3M tonnes out of them handled 
in the ports of the Baltic countries and27.1M tonnes — in the ports of Ukraine. In 2004 
the cargo turnover of the ports of RF increased by 23.4 % and amounted to 356M 
tonnes, dry cargo totaling 157.3M tonnes out of them. 
In 2004 Russian sea ports transshipped 17 M tonnes of cargo in containers of about 
1.4 MTEU. Container transportation increased as much as over 60 %, In St. Petersburg 
growth of container handling amounted to 34 %, in Novorossiysk to 23 % and in 
Vostochniy to 30 %. In the structure of cargo turnover of Russian ports export share 
amounted to 85 %, import share to 6 %, transit share to 3 %, and coastal transportation 
to 6 %. Cargo turnover of the ports of Southern basin increased by 14,6 % and exceeded 
142 M tonnes. 
 
 
7.2 Some recent tendencies and developments  
 
Three basic documents contain the transport strategy of Russian Federation up to 
2020, the strategy of development up to 2010 and the federal special program aimed to 
modernize transport system. 
Recently transport as a whole has complied with the growing demand to transfer 
cargo and passengers across the country. However, there is still the imbalance between 
the level of development of transport system and the demand dictated by social-
economic development of the country. That discrepancy can cause a slowing down the 
economic growth in the nearest future. 
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For example, 13 out of 16 biggest Russian ports does not have a direct way out to the 
network of federal motor roads. Currently the approaching rail tracks are the barrier to 
increased cargo flow towards Russian ports. There is some doubt as to plans to direct up 
to 40M tonnes of export coal via Russian ports. The railway fails to handle that volume 
of cargo. The situation with such export cargo as oil, grain, mineral fertilizers is not less 
complicated. Cargo in containers can be also referred to those groups of cargo because 
their transportation will doubtless outstrip its growth. Currently export of containers in 
RF amounts to less than 10 % out of total cargo transportation, import amounts to less 
than one third. 
There is one more imbalance. In Russia 27 % of motor roads are nowadays 
overloaded. During last 8 years the amount of cars has been growing as much as 3 times 
faster than motor roads capacity has been increasing. There is a low level of transport 
service availability. 28,000 of Russian towns inhabited by almost 12M people do not 
have all round access to main land communications. There is also some dependence on 
foreign carriers. Thus, current capacity of port infrastructure makes it possible to handle 
only 75 % of Russian foreign cargo. 65 % of tonnage controlled by Russian ship owners 
is registered in foreign ship lists. One of the most urgent problems to be solved by the 
Ministry is the improvement of safety, mostly of road traffic. Last year 35,000 people 
were killed during road accidents in Russia, much in excess of other countries.  
The strategy of development of transport of Russian Federation up to 2010 contains 
the ways to solve that and other problems. It provides for establishing the through motor 
traffic between western and eastern parts of the country. By 2010 they will have built 
and reconstructed almost 4,000 km of federal roads. The network of high speed 
motorways meeting the world standards will begin its operation for the first time. Over 
2,700 km of main railways will be built for rail transport. The length of electrified ways 
will increase as much as up to 3,300km.The standard speed will increase by 5km/h on 
average. The length of inland water ways with guaranteed depths will increase by 160 
km. Handling of containerized cargo in ports will increase up to 67M TEU per year. 
The rate of cargo delivery will increase as much as by 6-8 % and in main international 
transport corridors by 15-20%.  
In Russian ports the amount of cargo handling will almost double and become total 
540M tonnes if compared to the results of 2003. And Russian ports will transfer up to 
90 % of foreign cargo. The amount of transit transportations will increase up to 75M 
tonnes. Russia is planning to have approximately 5 % out of total world transit, moving 
from Asia to Europe and back, transported via its territory. By 2010 the tonnage, 
controlled by Russian ship owners, will have to increase up to 17M tonnes and over 50 
% of tonnage will be registered in national lists. The level of availability of transport 
infrastructure will increase by a quarter. The amount of road accidents caused by bad 
road conditions is planned to reduce by 15 %. 
The strategy also provides for realization of the projects of national importance 
including the construction of high speed motorway Moscow-St. Petersburg and other 
toll roads. The port complex in Ust-Luga, motor road Chita-Khabarovsk, ring road 
around St. Petersburg will be completed. The program to develop ferry transportations 
on the Baltic, Caspian and Black Sea areas will be realized. Modernization of inland 
water ways will make it possible to level the depths of almost all waterways in 
European part of Russia. 
One of the main conditions to carry out that and other plans is the improvement of the 
legal-normative field. Particularly, it is supposed to work out and adopt federal laws on 
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toll roads, on second international sea registry of ships, on sea ports, on transport safety, 
and so on. The strategy also provides for further perfection of machinery to finance 
projects. One of the most important directions is the development and establishment of a 
system of public-private partnership (PPP). 
The world average level of expenses on development and maintenance of transport 
system amounts to not less than 4-5 % of gross domestic product. That figure is taken 
into account annually while making the federal program of modernization of Russian 
transport system. That means the minimum of 700Bn roubles are to be invested 
annually. The amount is twice more than it was planned before. 
The use of PPP machinery is considered as one of the preferable directions of 
transport policy. In 2004 a special meeting of the government was held to discuss 
possibilities of PPP. It was mentioned that among such main types of PPP as contract 
agreement to carry out works for government needs, rent of state property, 
establishment of companies with private and governmental capital the most flexible one 
is concession. In case the related law is passed, it will provide possibility to develop that 
process in Russia. 
 
 
7.3 Southern Russian ports  
 
NOVOROSSIYSK 
 
The JS Novorossiysk Sea Trade Port is the largest enterprise among those of 
Novorossiysk dealing with cargo handling. Its handling turnover in 2004 was a bit 
above 70M tonnes, crude and oil products embracing 55M tonnes. The state keeps 20% 
of the shares. Yet, there are basic holders namely the financial corporation NIKoil and 
Russian General Bank, controlling more than 60% of shares together with involved 
shareholders. 
The second in Novorossiysk by handling numbers stands the port of Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium (CPC) in Yuzhnaya Ozereevka. The system is planned to be expanded up to 
67Mt yearly. The shareholders of the CPC are quite a lot. Firstly, there are 
governments: Russia — 24 %, Kazakhstan — 19%, the Sultanate of Oman — 7%. And 
the private holders of the consortium. 
The third place in terms of cargo handling is kept by the ship-repair yard acting as a 
port. The JS Novorossiyskiy SR2 has processed 2.2M tonnes of cargoes in 2004. The 
company's major shareholders are Russian General Bank (45.9% share), and the JS 
Novoship.  
The fourth goes the JS Novoroslesexport— 1.6M tonnes, known as Lesnoy Port 
(Wood Port). Here they handle lumber, round timber, fiberboard, plywood, paper, 
metals, containers. 
The fifth place is kept by JS NUTEP, handling mostly containers. They plan to 
expand the terminal capacity up to 300,000 TEU. 
In January 2005 the company Stoks + Ltd. established by the National Container 
Company and Deb Group purchased 14.93 % of shares and became the holder of 65 % 
stock of NUTEP in total. 
National Container Company (NCC) was established in 2002 by the companies 
Severstaltrans and First Quantum on parity terms. For its existence NCC have 
accumulated in its hands the First Container Terminal in St Petersburg (531,231 TEU 
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handled in 2004), Vladivostok Container Terminal (102,169 in 2004), NUTEP terminal 
in Novorossiysk, and Caspian Container Terminal (the port Olya, Astrakhan Region). 
Besides, NCC has the Baltic Container Terminal under construction in the new port Ust-
Luga on the Baltic Sea. 
 
TUAPSE 
 
The second by significance Russian port juncture on the Black Sea is situated 
westward of Novorossiysk in the Tuapse Bay. There are moors of the sea trade port, 
ship repair yard and ship machinery plant, and a former fishery port in its territory. 
In 2004 cargo turnover of the JS Tuapse Sea Trade Port amounted to20,2M tonnes, 
including 14.4M tonnes of crude and petrol products. The latter comes to the port by 
pipelines from reservoirs. For some recent years the port has changed several owners. 
First, JS Severstaltrans bought 65 % of the stock, then the whole lot. Now most of the 
shares are owned by Novolipetskiy Steel Plant (NLMK), the third steel mill company in 
Russia, they purchased 69.4 % of the stock from Severstaltrans. the reasons why the 
latter sold out its controlling stock are down-to-earth. There just was a too good price 
offered to reject it. While 3 years ago 65 % stock was acquired for 40—45M USD 
(different sources put different figures), then half a year ago 69,4 % stock was sold out 
for 10OM USD. Now NMLK can export up to 3M USD of metals through Tuapse. 
 
TAGANROG 
 
Taganrog town is situated on the northern shoreline of the Azov Sea in Taganrog Bay. 
Quays of the sea trade port, shiprepair yard and JS Priazovye are situated there too. In 
2004 JS Taganrog Sea Trade Port handled 1.9Mt. In 2002 Severstaltrans sold 38.9 % 
stock to the local company Karavay Plus which is a major grain trader in the region. 
The bargain amounted to 8M USD. 
 
ZHELEZNIY ROG 
 
There is a big port under construction on the cape Zhelezniy Rog. The building is 
invested in by 6 companies. In particular, JS Tolyattiazot intends to transship up to 6M 
tonnes of ammonia via the new port, SA Tarnanneftegaz — up to 9.5M tonnes of 
petroleum products, the Dutch firm Vopak Panagia — from 4 to 8M tonnes of crude, 
the LLCTam-antranzit — 10M tonnes of petroleum products. By 2015 the port 
Zhelezniy Rog may come the second in Russia after Novorossiysk.  
 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
There exist strong opportunities of attraction significant international transport flows 
(especially by waterways) to Ukraine. It was assessed that the volume of transit 
transportation through territory of the country may increase by 25-30 % in the near 
future, and in the long term – in several times. An important role will be played by the 
creation of common transport system in the country including the TRACECA corridor, 
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the Euro-Asian transport corridor (Black Sea – Caspian Sea) involving Russian inland 
waterways (Volga River, Volga-Don channel), Danube corridor (№7), and a corridor 
Baltic Sea - Black Sea. 
Ukrainian water transport is already involved in the functioning of existing transport 
corridors and it provides necessary services and support. There is also a large reserve of 
capacity (regarding both sea ports and inland waterways) which represent a base for 
optimistic prediction of future Ukrainian waterways development as part of the 
international transport axis. 
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Abstract 
 
The paper presents an analysis of the costs of shipping containers from four Chinese ports to 
representative central European destinations. It is demonstrated that the sum of costs by sea and costs 
over land, using both truck and rail transport, clearly favours the Italian ports, above all those of Genoa 
and Trieste for a geographic range that does not include all the Northern countries of the European Union 
and Russia but does cover a considerable portion of the southernmost cities of these countries such as 
Milan, Munich, Vienna, Budapest, Bern, Lyon, and Kiev. 
Other Italian ports can compensate for the handicap of the greater distance from this range of 
production and consumption zones, if they are appropriately reorganized with lower costs in direct 
competition with the Northern European ports, particularly the port of Naples, where COSCO has set up 
operation. However, despite the evident advantages in terms of distance and costs, Italian ports are unable 
to compete with those of Northern Europe on account of inefficiency affecting both their internal 
structure and inland transport. The purpose of the paper is to define costs in each sector (shipping costs, 
port costs and inland distribution costs) and to compare the relative port positions. 
 
Keywords: Ports; Inland costs; Intermodality; China; Northern range ports; Competitiveness. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper presents an analysis of the costs of shipping containers from four Chinese 
ports to representative central European destinations. It demonstrates that the sum of 
costs – in terms of generalised costs stricto sensu (i.d. GC=M+V*T, see World Bank) - 
by sea and costs over land, using both truck and rail transport, clearly favors Italian 
ports, above all those of Genoa and Trieste for a geographic range that does not include 
all the Northern countries of the European Union and Russia but does cover a 
considerable portion of the southernmost cities of these countries such as Milan, 
Munich, Vienna, Budapest, Bern, Lyon, and Kiev. 
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The markets that can be served by Mediterranean ports and which, given their growth 
rates, are of interest to all the terminal operators and the liner companies are (Table 1):  
• Market 1: part of the market of industrialized EU countries;  
• Market 2: the Balkans and the market of the Russian area, and  
• Market 3: the southern Mediterranean sea market. 
 
Table 1: Markets served by Mediterranean ports. 
Year 2004 People mill. GNP bill $ Growth % Export bill $ Import bill $ 
Market 1 175.8 4432 0.9 328 377 
Market 2 253.1 1377 4.7 149 161 
Market 3 256.2 2133 5.5 317 325 
Total 685.1 7942 2.8 794 864 
Source: Our elaboration from CIA World Factbook 2000. 
 
Other Italian ports can compensate for the handicap of the greater distance from this 
range of production and consumption zones, if they are appropriately reorganized with 
lower costs in direct competition with the Northern European ports: in particular, the 
port of Naples, where Cosco has been set up. However, despite the evident advantages 
in terms of distance and costs, Italian ports are unable to compete with those of 
Northern Europe on account of inefficiency affecting both their internal structure1 and 
inland transport. 
The factors of port competitiveness are largely discussed in the literature. On Italian 
ports see CNEL (2004). The purpose of this paper is to define costs in each sector 
(shipping costs, port costs and inland distribution costs) and to compare the relative port 
positions. 
 
 
2. Deepsea Shipping Costs  
 
In this analysis the following approach has been taken: for deepsea container shipping 
attention is focused on shipping costs, underlining a comparison among different 
shipping options as viewed from the perspective of the shipping lines.  
Freight rates are not used here as a parameter for Asia-Europe trade (Yap et al., 2003) 
because of their well known volatility. It would be a mistake to adopt an approach that 
is quantified in terms of specific rates at a particular time as this could easily distort the 
underlying competitive positions of transport alternatives. The correct approach focuses 
on the underlying costs of representative trading. 
Freight rates on the headhaul trades (i.e. those where the proportion of empties is 
negligible) are at present running at very high levels. In spite of this, a general decline in 
freight rates has been noted over the last ten years. 
It is interesting investigate briefly the ups and downs of freight rates before 
developing our theme. 
                                                 
1 The factors of port competitiveness are largely discussed in the literature. On Italian ports see CNEL 
(2004). 
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The reason why freight rates decreased over a prolonged period is linked to the 
process of consolidation in which the great liner shipping companies are still engaged. 
For the last few years, a growth in containerized trade of at least 5%-6% a year for the 
next fifteen to twenty years has been forecast by the major analysts of the sector 
(Lloyd’s, Ocean Shipping Consultants, Drewry Shipping Consultants, etc.). This means 
a three-fold increase in container throughput by sea within 2025. Consequently, the 
great liner shipping companies have long been accelerating not only the consolidation 
process, but also their orders for new and ever bigger ships (Cazzaniga Francesetti D., 
2005) and until recently, they have been enacting a policy of reduction in freight rates in 
order to eliminate competitors and smaller Companies (a predatory strategy) so as to 
obtain maximum market power. Thus up to 2002 the most important motives underlying 
the decrease in freight rates were partly the stiff competition among companies to gain 
hold of the greatest possible market and (paradoxically) also the excess supply by the 
liner shipping companies. This excess resulted from the race to achieve economies of 
scale by means of gigantic ships designed to absorb the greatest possible demand for 
transport.  
But since the end of 2002 the Chinese boom has accelerated the increase in container 
throughput and led to an escalation in freight rates for containers and also for liquid and 
dry bulk cargoes. Dry bulk freight rates literally took off to unprecedented heights, 
fuelled by China’s enormous needs for raw materials and other primary products used to 
develop its infrastructures. This take-off even accelerated during the period from the 
second half of 2003 up to the present time. Tanker rates experienced impressive ups and 
down during the year but resulted in an average level well above the previous years. 
Container freights rates marked a strong progression. Barry Rogliano Salles (2004) 
highlights the sharp rise in container freight rates from the end of 2002 onwards, after 
the ups and downs but predominantly decreasing trend that had been a characteristic 
since the 1990s. Furthermore, the robust levels of freight rates in 2003-2004 certainly 
helped a new wave of orders of new ships without taking into account the excess supply 
estimated until the end of 2002. (see Hoffman, 1998; Notteboom, 2004; Baird, 2001; 
Cullinane and Khanna, 1999; Haralambides, Cheung Tam He and Tsolakis, 2000) 
Let us now consider three classes of vessels: the 4000TEU and the 6500TEU which 
are currently dominant on the trade, and the 12,500TEU capacity vessels which will 
enter into working activity as from 2010, with just a few units, and a saving at-sea of 
some 29 per cent between 6500TEU and 12500TEU vessels under the current cost 
regime. The data considered for these vessels include: Capital costs, Operating costs, 
Bunker charges. These costs will obviously change in the future as a result, primarily, of 
the introduction of larger classes of vessels into the trades. It is apparent that scale 
economies are the driving force behind the push to larger sizes of vessels (Table 2). 
In order to reflect current distribution on the Chinese trades four origin ports have 
been selected: Dalian – in the north; Shanghai – in the east central region; and Hong 
Kong and Yantian – representing the Shenzhen markets. On the basis of the distance in 
nautical miles the distances of these ports from same Italian and northern range ports are 
calculated. The European ports selected are: Antwerp, Rotterdam and Hamburg in the 
north and Gioia Tauro, Taranto and, in regard to some aspects, Naples in the south.  
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Table 2: Container ship-trading costs 2004. 
 4000TEU 6500TEU 12500TEU 
    
Capacity - TEUs 4000 6500* 12500** 
    
Capital Costs    
Newbuild Price - mUS$ 58.0 89.5 123.0 
Daily Capital Charge - $ 23912 36898 50709 
Operating Costs    
Manning - US$/day 4400 4750 4750 
Repair & Maintenance - 
US$/day 
3673 5668 7790 
Insurance - US$/day 2513 3878 5330 
Admin/Other Charges - 
US$/day 
1500 1750 2000 
Total 12086 16046 19870 
Fuel Costs    
HFO - US$/tonne 220 220 220 
MDO - US$/tonne 350 350 350 
Consumption At Sea - 
25knots 
   
HFO – tonnes/day 140.0 256.0 350.0 
MDO - tonnes/day 2.5 2.8 3.0 
Consumption In Port    
HFO - tonnes/day 0.0 0.0 0.0 
MDO - tonnes/day 2.5 2.8 3.0 
Fuel Costs At Sea - 
US$/day 
31675 57300 78050 
Fuel Costs In Port - 
US$/day 
875 980 1050 
    
Total Costs At Sea - 
$/day 
67673 110244 148629 
Total Costs In port - 
$/day 
36873 53924 71629 
Per TEU At Sea - $/day 16.92 16.96 11.89 
Per TEU In Port - $/day 9.22 8.30 5.73 
    
Per Container At Sea - 
$/day 
25.38 25.44 17.84 
Per Container In Port - 
$/day 
13.83 12.44 8.60 
    
Per Container At Sea - 
€/day 
19.37 19.42 13.61 
Per Container In Port - 
€/day 
10.56 9.50 6.56 
    
* excludes agency, marketing and liner servicing costs. 
** potential vessel. 
These costs attempt to quantify the full costs of ownership and are not based upon charter rates. As owned 
vessels remain the dominant approach for most major lines this is appropriate. 
Source: Ocean Shipping Consultants Ltd. 
 
Northern range ports are organized in a ‘so-called’ multiport system each one playing 
the role of hub. On the contrary Naples can play a role both of feeder and regional 
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gateway port. Nevertheless the port of Naples, like Genoa and Trieste, is not a hub port, 
in the light of its technical characteristics, but it is the only Italian port where a major 
Chinese company, COSCO, manages a terminal in a joint venture with other companies. 
Recall that a hub port is a central port of a vast geographic area, where cargo departs 
towards or arrives from a huge range of commercial ports. The hub port is located on 
the shortest route that leads directly across the area, and by virtue of its deep draught 
(16m.), it enables gigantic over-6000 TEU ships to dock2; its port operations are very 
efficient, and travel times and schedules are carefully respected. Mother-ship gains an 
advantage above all from: maximum reduction in transit time and an optimal load factor 
(roughly 95%) guaranteed by the great industrial centers of the hinterland.. In Northern 
Europe, unlike the Mediterranean, the close proximity of great ports with large markets 
in the direct hinterland means that there is still a notable presence of direct calls on an 
average transshipment share – the transshipment is less than 40% out of total container 
throughput (Notteboom, 2004). 
The approach taken is to define costs at-sea and in-port and apply these to 
representative voyages on the basis of known voyage times and port rotations3 This has 
been calculated on the basis of a high load factor of 95 per cent which reflects the 
current position for China-Europe trades. Other relevant costs such as Suez Canal 
charges have also been included in the analysis. These voyage costs are then converted 
to shipping costs in terms of Euros per 40’ container (FEU).  
There is a fairly significant shipping cost saving for the Italian hub port option, and let 
us consider Naples a part. This reflects the shorter haul lengths involved.  
 
Table 3: Summary table – Deepsea shipping costs 2004*- Euros per 40’ container**. 
To Rotterdam Antwerp Hamburg Gioia/Taranto Naples 
From      
4000TEU 
vessel 
     
Dalian 774.21 774.59 788.07 651.62 652.98 
Shanghai 753.55 753.82 767.30 630.86 632.22 
Hong Kong 711.31 711.58 725.06 588.62 589.98 
Yantian 712.67 712.94 726.42 589.98 591.34 
6500TEU 
vessel 
     
Dalian 743.07 743.34 756.85 620.07 621.43 
Shanghai 722.25 722.52 736.04 599.25 600.61 
Hong Kong 679.90 680.18 693.69 556.90 558.27 
Yantian 681.27 681.54 695.05 558.27 559.63 
*excludes agency, marketing and liner servicing costs. 
** calculated at US$1.3 - 1€. 
Source: our elaboration on Ocean Shipping Consultants (OSC) data. 
 
It currently costs around €743 to ship a container from Dalian to Rotterdam or 
Antwerp in a 6500TEU vessel. The comparative costs to Gioia Tauro, Taranto are 
                                                 
2 ‘Strategies for container port’- supplement of the magazine ‘Cargo system’ march 2001 
3 It has been considered: days and costs for two vessels TEU6500 and TEU4000, load factor 95%, ocean 
haul length, sea days at 22 knots, port and canal days, cargo size- boxes (4117 for a 6500 TEU vessel, and 
2533 for 4000TEU vessel), sea costs per day, port costs per day, total sea costs, total port costs, canal 
charges, voyage cost, n. FEU, cost per FEU, euro per FEU. 
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placed at some € 620 per FEU. It is this cost saving that must be set against higher 
inland distribution costs. It should be noted that these costs are only vessel costs and are 
those that are incurred for the operation of a vessel by an owner/operator. As the 
primary function of this analysis is to derive comparative costs other liner charges have 
not been included in the analysis. 
 
 
3. The costs of port transit 
 
As regards port costs in the ports under review, port transit costs are examined, 
consisting of both port dues and stevedoring costs. Port dues4 - charges that are levied 
by Port Authorities and other agencies for utilisation of dock facilities and for access to 
the berths represent a major cost sector that is important in determining the competitive 
position of a particular port or terminal. Port dues are defined under several large 
categories that are relevant to each port.  
Stevedoring charges –payments from the shipping line to the terminal operating 
company for offloading, storing and loading the container onto a barge, truck or rail 
wagon.  
 
 
3.1 Port transit costs: port dues 
 
This represents a highly complex area. The charging structure is different in each port 
and there are also great differences between the various locations served within each 
port. Some of these charges may be regarded as statutory, and are thus not open to 
negotiation, whilst in other instances the interests of the Port Authorities are seen to 
influence the actual charges that are levied. 
Typical rates have been identified for the following container operations.  
Deepsea Operations – 1. This assumes the regular berthing of a 4000TEU fully-
cellular containership, with a GRT of 55,500t, LOA 295m and a draught of 12m. This 
will regularly call at the identified port, but will only appear a maximum of five times 
per annum. At each call, 1530 containers are handled. 
Deepsea Operations – 2. This assumes the regular handling of a 6500TEU (S-Class 
type) fully-cellular container ship, with a GRT of 91,650t, LOA 347m and a maximum 
draught of 14.5m. Once again, a regular discount is relevant, and consignment size is 
placed at 2290 containers. 
These conditions are to be seen as fairly representative of the current and anticipated 
market under consideration – although consignment sizes are now increasing. 
Under standard liner terms, the ship owner (or operator) carries the entire 
responsibility for ship-specific costs. Operators may of course undertake considerably 
greater responsibilities, if they operate their own terminal and/or distribution system. 
Total ship-related costs can be significant, although they tend to be the aggregate of 
numerous individual components. These costs vary greatly on a port-specific basis. 
Such differences force a piecemeal and empirical approach to be adopted in determining 
                                                 
4 Typical rates have been identified for the following container operations. 
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costs. However, in the ports under review, it is clear that costs are defined under several 
major categories that are relevant to each port.  
These include: 
• Harbour Dues. These are usually calculated on the basis of vessel GRT, but are 
sometimes cargo-specific. 
• Berthing Dues are calculated on the basis of cargo volume and charged to the 
ship owner. This system predates containerization, but remains of significance in 
Belgian ports. 
• Towage in docks and on approaches is related to distance traveled, vessel LOA, 
number of movements and number of tugs involved. 
• Pilotage is charged both within the harbour and on approach, and is usually 
determined by the draught and/or LOA of the vessel. 
• Mooring and Unmooring is usually billed as an additional charge and is also 
usually determined by vessel LOA. 
The data considers the current cost structures in the various ports under review. These 
have been calculated on the basis of published tariffs, adjusted by direct feedback from 
ship owners with regard to the actual charges paid5. The basis for the calculation of 
these charges is complex and is clouded by the availability of discounts and special 
arrangements for favoured customers. However, it is clear that North European ports are 
more expensive than the Italian ports under current market conditions (but the 
conditions of in-port efficiency and the true availability of intermodal means in Italian 
ports are dubious). 
 
Table 4: Comparative port dues calculated for 2004 (Euros per container). 
 Euros/call 2004-1 Euro/container Euros/call 2004-2 Euro/container 
ECT Delta 26998 17.65 36002 15.72 
Antwerp Sckeldt 33979 22.21 49581 21.65 
Hamburg 
Altenwerder 
43735 28.58 59715 26.08 
Naples 26775 17.50 34007 14.85 
Gioia Tauro /Taranto 22751 14.87 28053 12.25 
1-4000TEU deepsea liner (55500 grt, 295m loa,12m draught) handling a total of 1530containers per call. 
Line calls 5 times per month. 
2-6500TEU deepsea liner (91650grt, 347m loa, 14.5 draught) handling a total of 2290 containers per call. 
Line calls 5 times per month. 
NOTE. These data are, of course, highly dependent on consignment size, as noted. The costs are 
increased and spread across the number of the containers typically loaded. 
Source: Our elaboration on data OSC Ltd. 
 
 
3.2 Port transit costs: Stevedoring Charges 
 
Attention will now turn towards the current level of container handling charges in the 
major terminals under review. The intention of this analysis is to allow a direct 
comparison of the actual prices paid by the shipping lines to the terminal operators in 
                                                 
5 It is known that further discounting is available for major customers in most ports, with Port Authorities 
anxious to improve the competitive position of their terminals. However, data on this is sketchy and 
difficult to compare directly. In some cases, however, discounts of 20-25 per cent have been noted. 
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each of the ports under review. The resulting ‘container handling charge’ is different 
from the publicly quoted ‘terminal handling charge’ that is levied by shipping lines on 
the cargo owners. The methodology utilized here reflects the complexity of the issues 
involved and, accordingly, provides typical cost estimates on the basis of: published 
tariffs, data provided by container terminals and data provided and confirmed by major 
shipping lines. 
In general, the level of the container handling charge is seen to be highly 
commercially sensitive and there are several areas where the market is opaque to 
analysis. However, on the basis of continuing reviews of these issues for numerous 
specific studies in the past fifteen years6 it is possible to provide a degree of direct 
comparison and to analyse the true relative position of the terminals under analysis. 
The identification of container handling charges is an extremely complex undertaking. 
Whilst some terminals publish a tariff for container handling costs, this provides only 
the most general guide to the level of charges that are actually levied. It is usually the 
case that discounts are available for volume customers and often further flexibility is 
made available in the light of major marketing initiatives. In addition, the various 
activities included in ‘container handling charges’ are also found to vary between ports 
and, indeed, often in different terminals within the same port. 
There are two major points to be addressed in ensuring that the data are comparable: 
what is the consignment size (i.e. what type of customer is being served)? And what is 
actually included in the tariff? 
 
 
3.2.1 What is the consignment size? 
 
Container handling charges in most ports are seen to be highly sensitive to marketing 
initiatives. In order to minimise the resulting divergence in quoted rates an assessment 
has been made of a ‘typical customer’ i.e. a representative deepsea liner customer, and 
the key details are as follows: the contract covers an annual handling of around 
76,500/114,500 units; the service offers around 50 calls per annum; typically 1530/2290 
containers are handled per port call; the average vessel sizes are 4500-8800TEU; 
TEU/FEU box ratio: 50/50; loaded/Empty ratio: 80/20. 
This represents a fairly medium to small customer for higher volume ports and it may 
well be the case that further bulk discounts could be negotiated as volumes increase 
further. It is estimated that with volumes increasing to above 0.25m units per annum a 
price reduction of around 4.5-5 per cent could be achieved. This can be anticipated 
when Ultra Large Container Ships are introduced into the trades. 
 
 
3.2.2 What is included in the tariff? 
 
The Basic Handling Charge includes: -Handling costs between ship and yard (in 
either direction); -Handling costs between yard and gate (in either direction). 
Other handling charges that are also billed to the customer in different degrees in each 
terminal include: hatch opening and closing; cargo plan preparation; overtime costs; 
lashing/unlashing; extra yard moves; weighing; and stand-by on vessel account. 
                                                 
6 Various OSC reports. 
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In the analysis, handling charges relate to the cycle of container movements between 
the vessel and the gate of the yard (on rail, road or barge) in each direction. In most 
cases these are directly comparable but in some instances – specifically in Antwerp – 
the position is more complex, with some charges billed to the shipping line and some to 
the shipper (cargo owner/forwarder). 
Basically, the representative costs for container handling consist in a payment of 
113.45 euro at ECT of Rotterdam, 93 euro at Antwerp, 115.16 euro at Hamburg, 131.00 
at Naples, 102.45 euro at Gioia Tauro/Taranto. 
The following points should be noted: there is strong competition in stevedoring 
prices between Antwerp and Rotterdam terminals. Generally speaking, Antwerp has 
always been cheaper and this reflects its less favorable riverine location. Handling 
prices are somewhat more expensive in Germany, with this reflecting the strong level of 
demand and the somewhat distinct hinterland. Italian ports have historically been more 
expensive and this is still noted at Naples. Prices are much cheaper at present in Gioia 
Tauro, with this reflecting the owner’s strong commitment to developing the 
import/export sector. 
 
Table 5: Container handling charge for regional ports 2004. 
 Port container* 
ECT Delta 113.45 
Antwerp-Sckeldt 92.46 
Hamburg- Altenwerder 115.16 
Naples 131.00 
Gioia Tauro and Taranto 102.45 
*vessel-gate.  
Analysis has been developed on each of the ports under review since the early/mid 1990s. 
Source: OSC Ltd. 
 
 
3.3 Total port transit costs: miles, days, euros from China 
 
In conclusion, let us present the differences in terms of miles, days and euros per FEU 
(M+V*T) from China to the cheapest and closest Northern European port (Antwerp) 
and towards the most expensive and most distant port (Hamburg) and towards the 
Italian hub ports of Gioia Tauro and Taranto with the feeders Genoa and Trieste. 
Table 6 also shows, for Italy, the costs per FEU and the additional distances to reach 
the feeder ports of Genoa and Trieste from the hub ports of Gioia Tauro and Taranto.  
It can be noted that while the Italian ports present some advantages as regards total 
journey days and costs (above all in terms of travel time), the journey differences 
compared to Northern European ports are always positive, but are almost two days 
longer if the legs for the two feeder ports of Genoa and Trieste are added. This 
observation makes it clear that the maritime leg is not the only focus of competition in 
seeking to attract Chinese merchandise (and goods originating from the Far East in 
general). Rather, competition comes into play on the expensive inland terrestrial leg, as 
will be illustrated below in further detail.  
It must be taken into account that the Northern European ports, with their vast inland 
import-export activity, are final/initial ports for goods, that is to say, they are not feeder 
ports that depend on a hub, like the Italian ports. They do not form part of a hub and 
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spokes system because vast reference markets lie directly behind them. In Italy, on the 
other hand, the distances of the feeder ports of Genoa and Trieste7 from the hub ports of 
Gioia Tauro and Taranto8 must also be considered. 
 
Table 6: Miles, days, euros per FEU of four Chinese ports to representative destinations. 
From Yantian to Miles Days Euro/FEU 
Antwerp 9769 19,4 624 
Hamburg 10014 19,9 636 
Gioia Tauro 7485 14,9 513 
Taranto 7485 14,9 513 
Genoa 7959 15,8 656 
Trieste 7995 15,9 658 
 
From Shanghai to Miles Days Euro/FEU 
Antwerp 10521 20,9 661 
Hamburg 10766 21,4 673 
Gioia Tauro 8237 16,3 550 
Taranto 8237 16,3 550 
Genoa 8711 17,3 693 
Trieste 8747 17,4 695 
 
From Hong Kong to  Miles Days Euro/FEU 
Antwerp 9744 19,3 623 
Hamburg 9989 19,8 635 
Gioia Tauro 7460 14,8 512 
Taranto 7460 14,8 512 
Genoa 7934 15,7 655 
Trieste 7970 15,8 65 
 
From Dalian to Miles Days Euro/FEU 
Antwerp 10903 21,6 679 
Hamburg 11148 22,1 691 
Gioia Tauro 8619 17,1 568 
Taranto 8619 17,1 568 
Genoa 9093 18,0 711 
Trieste 9129 18,1 713 
Source: our elaboration partially relies on OSC data. 
 
4. Inland Distribution Charges 
 
The remaining cost sector that is critical to the competitive position of the port is the 
inland distribution cost from the terminal gate to the consignee. In order to define the 
                                                 
7 For Genoa and Trieste, data on the costs of the maritime leg, transit and handling costs etc. were 
likewise obtained directly from the Authorities and checked by means of the liner shipping companies. 
8 Gioia Tauro and Taranto are, according to the rules of the hub and spokes system, ports on the shortest 
route between Suez and Gibraltar, but, commercially speaking, their hinterland is the desert. 
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competitive position with regard to inland distribution costs, it is necessary to analyse 
current (and forecast) comparative cost developments between the identified ports and 
the inland locations. 
The following representative locations have been used in the current analysis: Milan; 
Munich; Vienna; Budapest; Bern, Lyon, Kiev.   
Inland distribution for these trades is dominated by the rail option. The haul lengths 
involved are clearly sufficient in most cases to justify the use of intermodal trains and 
this is the main option. There may also be significant truck movements but the costs 
involved limit the use of this option to smaller consignments and to specific locations 
that are not well accessed by intermodal terminals. Note that, in spite of the reliability of 
sources, contracts with truck or train carriers can vary according to the number and 
frequency of containers. The costs of train and truck change in each country (although 
Italian rail does seem to be somewhat cheaper). This analysis does not consider the 
relative efficiency of different rail operators and it should be noted that shippers report 
strong difficulties with the Italian routeing at present, explaining why shippers continue 
to pay a reliability premium for the northern option. The Italian difficulties are primarily 
linked to concerns over capacity.  
Several regional studies highlight the different prices per km. for rail and truck in 
each country, but it is difficult to standardize the different criteria used. In our inquire 
the indicative rates are based upon those quoted by large haulier and rail operators for 
contract volume business reported by OSC; rail and road charges on the routes under 
review are based upon quoted rates in the second half of 2004. Furthermore, it must 
kept in mind that the terminal operators and those liner companies that have network 
terminals can reduce the tariffs by choosing one or another port, especially if they have 
control over the inland transport. This could make a port particularly attractive.  
 
 
4.1 Inland costs. 
 
Truck: cost/km.  
In Europe, according to our OSC data elaboration, truck transportation cost ranges 
from €1.99 for 200 km stretches, to €1.26 for 600 km, to €1.00 up to 1800 km stretches. 
In Italy the real cost (not the official one, according to Cetena9) that transportation 
workers apply is calculated at around €1.19/km (official fares), and €0.42/km (real 
fares) for long distance stretches. It should be remembered that in Italy the majority of 
hauliers are composed of small companies or even one-man trucking businesses that 
either work independently or take on outsourced work for the large trucking companies. 
Such hauliers, who cover the greater part of the Italian market, not only do not observe 
the rules but they face very stiff competition in procuring loads. This explains the 
difference between the figures provided by the official Associations of the category of 
hauliers and the actual situation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 According to Cetena (2003), the official cost by truck is roughly 1, 19 euro; the real figure of 0.42, 
which is a lower cost, is due – as mentioned above – to failure to respect the rules on hours of rest, 
motorway speed and other aspects. 
See also http://www.iicgenova.it/documents/ricerca/workshop_160505/Mor.pdf. 
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Train: cost/km  
Train transportation costs, according to our OSC data elaboration, adds the cargo 
breaking costs (around €150/FEU—Source: OSC). The cost varies from €1.10 for 600 
km, to €0.75 for 1200 km stretches, to 0.66 over 1800 km.  
As regards speed, although the White Book of European Commission (2001) 
calculates just 18km/hour for European trains (because of heterogeneous organization, 
repeated controls in every country, different kinds of goods transported —such as 
livestock—etc.), this value was not taken into consideration, because block trains with 
20-30 cars leaving from ports have higher average speeds. The average ground speed 
has been calculated to be around 30-40 Km/h. 
It is well known that throughout Europe, although train transportation has constantly 
augmented, it has not able to keep up with port growth. Together with the high costs 
induced by the various rigidities, and the cargo breaking costs with train transportation, 
this constitutes the reason for the popularity of container transportation via truck. 
For trucking, pricing is normally made on a distance basis, with heavy loading of 
short moves, which would limit driver utilisation over his working shift, and within 
some sort of contract arrangement. Deep-sea carriers generally have weekly services, 
and usually have to use larger hauliers who, in effect, gain further economies through 
consolidating haulage. 
The effect of distance on rate per kilometre is illustrated in Figure 1. This is based 
upon a continuous review of actual rates charged in the European market and includes 
the recent tightening of the market. This has been driven by both increasing demand and 
also by a progressive increase in trucking cost structures. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Cost per km. 
Note: Train cost in the table is augmented by the breaking costs. 
Source: based on OCS and Cetena data. 
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4.2 Total inland costs  
 
Let us now present the total inland costs by road or rail multiplied by the distances 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Total inland costs. 
Average base costs - Source: based on OCS and Cetena data. 
 
 
Advantages in terms of distance: truck or train in relation to the different stretches. 
Let us apply the costs identified (Figure 2) for the inland distances that separate some 
maufacturing and consumption cities of markets one and two from the ports under 
examination. It should be kept in mind that it is these costs, rather than the cost of the 
maritime leg or even the number of days at sea towards the European ports, that 
determine port power of attraction. 
 
 
On a case by case basis, the shortest distance in kilometers either by train or by truck 
was used. Table 7 shows a number of surprising facts: 
• the distances between Trieste and Munich, Vienna and Budapest are less than 
half of the distances between Trieste and the three northern ports.  
• the distances between Genoa and Munich and Bern are less that 2/3 of the 
distances between Genoa and the northern European ports. 
In short, through Italy one would achieve a 51% reduction of costs, 51% for 
Budapest, 34% for Bern, 48% for Vienna, and 39% for Lyon. Basically, in terms of 
distances, Genoa and Trieste are clearly the best options to serve markets one and two. 
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Table 7: Distances in Km. 
Distances Rotterdam Antwerp Hamburg Minimum 
northern ports 
Genoa Trieste Minimum Italian 
ports 
Milan 1045 945 1230 945 138 412 138 
Munich 875 790 785 785 645 515 515 
Vienna 1200 1100 935 935 1025 490 490 
Budapest 1455 1355 1195 1195 1265 585 585 
Bern 795 690 925 690 455 737 455 
Lyon 873 768 1142 768 469 842 469 
Kiev 2610 2510 2350 2350 2420 1740 1740 
 
Shortest 
distance 
Milan Munich Vienna Budapest Bern Lyon Kiev 
Northern ports 945 785 935 1195 690 768 2350 
Italian ports 138 515 490 585 455 469 1748 
Reduction % 85% 34% 48% 51% 34% 39% 26% 
Source: our elaboration partially relies on OSC data. 
 
Advantages in terms of costs 
Let us will now examine the typical inland costs per FEU. The costs of inland 
stretches per FEU was calculated because the majority of containers considered are 40 
feet long, that is, about 12 m.. Let us note that by using vehicles which travel from the 
closest Italian port to reach the above mentioned cities instead of trucks or trains10 
coming from the Northern European ports a cut in costs ranging between 21 and 70% is 
achieved. 
 
Table 8: Indicative inland costs per FEU. 
TRUCK Northern 
ports 
Italian ports Cuts% RAIL Minimum 
northern ports 
Minimum 
Italian ports 
Cuts% 
Milan 1022 310 70% Milan 802 326 59% 
Munich 894 691 23% Munich 726 594 18% 
Vienna 1013 672 34% Vienna 797 581 27% 
Budapest 1237 743 40% Budapest 924 630 32% 
Bern 821 645 21% Bern 681 562 18% 
Lyon 880 656 26% Lyon 718 570 21% 
Kiev 2352 1750 26% Kiev 1566 1215 22% 
Source our elaboration. 
 
 
4.3 Total advantages. Sea-land legs 
 
Finally, let us look at the global intermodal ship+truck or train costs. In Table 9 the 
costs by sea are summed (hypothesizing a 6000Teu full container from Asia) with costs 
by land per FEU, contrasting Italian with Northern European ports and showing the 
absolute and percent advantages. The interest per single container out of the average 
value of a container (roughly 30,000/35,000 dollars. Source: our investigation) for the 
additional days required to reach the Northern ports is also indicated. For the sake of 
                                                 
10 Despite the fact that the train is the best option for ecological reasons as well. See White book. 
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brevity, let us present only the data concerning the port of Shanghai, which is located in 
the centre of China.  
 
Table 9: Global costs*. 
From 
Shanghai to 
Northern 
ports 
Italian ports Time cut, days Price cut % reduction Capital 
interest 
 Euro/FEU Euro/FEU  Euro/FEU % Euro/FEU 
Milan 1576 960 4.6 616 39% 35 
Munich 1512 1213 4.4 299 20% 34 
Vienna 1583 1200 4.6 382 24% 36 
Budapest 1710 1248 4.8 462 27% 37 
Bern 1455 1160 3.9 295 20% 30 
Lyon 1492 1167 3.9 325 22% 30 
Kiev 2352 1881 4.8 472 20% 37 
*As per OSC data, it was calculated a €113 THC for northern European ports, € 117 for Genoa, and € 138 
for Trieste. 
Source: our elaboration. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Attention as been directed towards the overall transport costs involved in serving the 
markets identified on various Chinese trades. This is an aggregation of the cost sectors 
already discussed, with shipping costs, port and stevedoring charges and inland delivery 
costs being the areas under review. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from these data: 
• The inland rail/truck charges and shipping costs are of basic importance and 
developments in each sector will have a proportional impact on comparative 
costs. 
• The costs of port transit (dues plus stevedoring) are a relatively small part of the 
chain and discounting in this sector will have a marginal impact on route choice. 
• On a cost basis Italian ports are competitive for several markets of central-
southern Europe including the Balkans and Kiev. This represents a changed 
situation. As recently as 2000 the costs were lower for the Northern Europe 
option. This reflects the improved productivity of the ports and rail system. 
However, Italian standards of reliability remain lower and shippers continue to 
pay a reliability premium for the northern option. 
• There has been a progressive shift northwards of the economic watershed in the 
past few years and it is apparent that Italian ports can now also be competitive 
particularly in the central-southern region, although market share remains 
limited. 
• In the central European market – here represented by Vienna and Budapest till 
Kiev – each option is broadly competitive on a cost basis. This will be the area 
of greatest competition in the coming period. 
• As the data show, it is above all the inland legs that constitute the crucial focus 
of competition between Northern European ports and Italian ports. This 
observation is indirectly confirmed by the double strategy of terminal operators 
and the liner shipping companies. Both set themselves as their prime objective 
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the aim of obtaining the concession of the greatest number of terminals, creating 
a network in Northern Europe and Italy (as in the Mediterranean) of 
interchangeable ports. As their second objective, they aim either to acquire 
directly or to manage port-related intermodal truck/train services by joint-
venture in order to manage the entire transport chain. 
 
Finally some issues are not captured by this purely cost/distance based approach. 
Firstly, there is a clear time advantage for the Italian option on Asian trades. This can be 
a significant issue for higher value cargoes – providing schedules are maintained.  
Secondly, inland costs are based upon quotations from providers. It should be noted 
that delays are more frequent on the Italian option and that intermodal links from 
northern ports are now highly efficient. It is not possible to directly cost these issues but 
they are often noted as negatives for the Italian option. These problems can be solved. 
Furthermore, the greater the increase in container movement in the northern ports, the 
greater the likelihood that they may achieve economies of scale over the entire journey. 
Generally, it is clear that the process of modification of the Italian port and intermodal 
sector has progressed very rapidly and re-secured much of its natural hinterland. The 
next stage will be to increase its competitive position in the identified markets, 
particularly EU markets. The EU market’s low growth rate should not deceive: the 
importance of EU markets is based on the fact that, compared with the other two 
markets, it buys a bigger range of goods with high added value, and, above all, on the 
fact that it is able to sell goods with high added value to China. 
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Abstract 
 
The paper illustrates the current state of the transport infrastructure in Poland, with special attention to 
the road, rail and airport infrastructure. It highlights the recent trends in freight and passenger transport 
and discusses the project for improving and updating the transport networks. Though some improvements 
are taking place, funds availability remains the main problem for the enhancing of the current poor state 
of the transport infrastructure. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Transport infrastructure is widely recognised as factor determining the level of socio-
economic development of a country and its economic growth. An undeveloped 
infrastructural network causes barriers to the free movement of people, goods, services, 
capital and production factors. The existing transport network in Poland appears to have 
a negative effect on the localization of foreign industries and services, on international 
trade with EU and bordering countries and on the competitiveness of Poland. 
 
 
2. Recent transport trends 
 
Data from the official government statistics indicate that the total volume of freight 
transport, both in tonnes and in tonne-km, had a negative trend in the period 200-2002 
(Table 1). The year 2003 presents a slight increase, but at levels still lower than in the 
year 2000. It is interesting to note that in tonnes the main decrease has taken place in 
road transport and to a minor extent in inland waterways transport, whereas rail and 
maritime transport have increased their volume. On the contrary in tonne-km, road is 
                                                 
∗ Corresponding author: Monika Musiał – Malago’(musialm@inwind.it) 
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the only growing mode of transport, with maritime transport being the mode that has 
lost more traffic. Relative to road, rail transport is still an important means of freight 
transport both in terms of tonnes and in tonne-km. 
 
Table 1: Freight traffic in Poland*. 
Details 2000 2002 2003 
in thousand tonne 
total freight transport  1347895 1304387 1308802 
rail transport 187247 222908 241629 
road transport 1083071 1002368 981957 
inland waterways transport 10433 7729 7968 
maritime transport 22774 25222 25435 
air transport 28 28 31 
in million tonne - kilometres 
total freight transport  282559 248685 253028 
rail transport 54448 47756 49584 
road transport 72842 74679 78160 
inland waterways transport 1173 1126 872 
maritime transport 133654 104190 100455 
air transport 88 80 86 
*Note that the sum of the available modal data do not add up to the total volume. 
Source: www.stat.gov.pl. 
 
Passenger transport in Poland, measured both in passengers and in passenger-km, 
declined in the period 2000-2003 (Table 2) in all modes with the exception of air 
transport. It is noteworthy that the share of road transport in Poland is so far much lower 
than in the western EU countries. 
Table 2: Passenger traffic in Poland*. 
Details 2000 2002 2003 
in thousands 
total passenger transport  1319972* 1124940 1112564 
rail transport 360687 304025 283390 
cars transport 954515 815041 822875 
inland waterways 1625 1648 1795 
see transport 625 559 526 
air transport 2880 3667 3978 
in million tonne - kilometres 
passenger transport total 62055 56903 56690 
rail transport 24092 20749 19653 
cars transport 31735 29295 29996 
inland waterways 26 37 34 
see transport 168 150 137 
air transport 6034 6672 6870 
*Note that the sum of the available modal data do not add up to the total volume. 
Source: www.stat.gov.pl. 
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Notwithstanding the comparatively low level of road transport, car ownership is 
increased by about 14 % over the same period. Car density in 2003 reached 294,4 units 
per 1000 inhabitants (Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Number of cars in Poland. 
Details 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Number of cars (in thousands) 9991260 10503052 11028852 11243827 
Volume of cars per 1000 inhabitants 258.5 271.9 288.6 294.4 
Source: www.stat.gov.pl. 
 
3. Polish transport infrastructure 
 
 
3.1 The development of the road network in Poland 
 
Poland represents a link between Eastern/Western and Northern/Southern part of the 
European Union. This geographical location and the potential capacity of the domestic 
market provide an important opportunity for development of Poland as a whole. Four 
European transport corridors cross the country (Regulations Gazette of Polish Republic , 
2001): 
• Corridors I: Helsinki – Tallin – Riga – Kowno –Warsaw (Via Baltica) – with the 
branch line Riga – Kaliningrad – Elblag – Gdansk, 
• Corridor II: Berlin – Warsaw – Minsk – Moscow – Nizhni Novgorod, 
• Corridor III: Berlin – Dresden - Wroclaw – Katowice – Lvov – Kiev with branch 
line Dresden – Krzywa – (Legnica), 
• Corridor IV: Gdansk – Katowice – Zlin with branch line Grudziac – Poznan and 
Czestochowa - Katowice – Ostrava. 
 
Because of increase of international transport in Europe, during the Pan–European 
Conference of Transport Ministers in Helsinki in 1997, two more road project were 
recommended: Gdansk – Warsaw – Lublin – Kowel – Odessa – Bucharest; and 
Swinoujscie – Szczecin - south border – Czech Republic. 
It is widely acknowledged that the present, bad condition of Polish’s roads hampers 
the international trade with European Union and other neighbouring countries, has a 
negative impact on foreign direct investments, and on the mobility of goods and people. 
At the end of 2003 Poland had 18225.2 km of domestic roads, 405.1 km of motorways 
and 225.6 km of expressways. The road pavements standard is not fully adjusted to the 
TIR trucks movement. The Polish roads can accommodate a truck axle pressures of 60 – 
80 kN whilst European roads accommodate up to an axle pressures of 115 kN. By the 
end of 2013 it is planned to build and re-build about 1535 kilometres of motorways, as 
follows (www.gddkia.gov.pl): 
• A4 and A18 – from the Germany border to Cracow, 
• A2 – from the west border to Warsaw, 
• A1 – Gdansk – Czestochowa – Katowice – Ostrava, 
• A6 – from Szczecin runs down to west border of the country. 
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Fig. 1: Existing road network and motorway system in Poland in 2003. 
Source: www.gddkia.gov.pl. 
 
 
Together with building of motorways, the regular roads will be updated and 
constructed. An extremely important function for higher standard of traffic will be given 
to expressways, which, by 2013, are planned to amount to 1630 kilometres. 
The pre-condition for improving the transport network is the availability of funds. Till 
2003, the main source of financing for transport infrastructure in Poland has been the 
Polish budget (Table 4). From the 2004 the role of EU and international funds is 
increased.  
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Table 4: Funds invested in road construction in 2001 – 2004 (mln. zloty). 
Details 2001 2002 2003 2004 
State budget (public funds) 1741.1 1975.3 1934.7 2446.8 
Special Funds of  General 
Directorate of National 
Roads and Motorways 
306.3 323.7 502.8 29.0 
National Motorway Funds 0.0 0.0 0.0 1000.0 
European Investment Bank 334.1 550.4 912.2 999.3 
The World Bank 238.8 162.0 222.2 90.0 
Funds from European Union 223.5 244.6 413.8 1328.5 
Self - Governed Funds 105.8 19.2 46.9 19.1 
Concessionaire’s Funds ------ 988.5 1171.2 702.5 
Total 2949.6 4263.7 5203.8 6615.2 
Dynamic (rok 2001= 100) 100 144.6 176.4 297.8 
Source: Programme of Building National Roads and Motorways in Poland, www.stat.gov.pl. 
 
Increasing and updating the level of transport infrastructure attracts investors and 
makes cities and regions more competitive. The creating of a new connection centre on 
the eastern side of Warsaw (between Minsk and Siedlce) will be part of two new future 
projects corridors called Via Baltica and Via Intermare and will terminate the highway 
A2. The most attractive locations in relation to communication availability are two big 
polish cities: Warsaw and Poznan. But the highway A4 situated on the southern part of 
the country induces potential development for Wroclaw, Katowice, Cracow and 
Rzeszow. 
The plans regarding the afore-mentioned Via Baltica should improve the economical 
position of three cities: Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin – Swinoujscie, important Baltic 
ports serving Middle and Eastern Europe. It will develop also the regions located east of 
Warsaw bordering with Lithuania - especially Bialystok. Additionally some of the cities 
like Bialystok, Lublin, Kielce will be connected by expressways . 
 
 
3.2 Rail infrastructure 
 
The railway infrastructure plays an important role in the transport system. The Polish 
rail network is quantitatively well-developed, it has a relatively high level of 
electrification and a high percentage of lines with two or more tracks. But the quality of 
railways infrastructure is poor: it is technically degraded and, compared with other 
European countries, it has worse exploitation features, being still characterised by low 
competitiveness and services quality. The existing railway lines, particularly those 
located in the European transport corridors, have to adopt European standards, enabling 
them train speeds of 160 km/h in passenger traffic, 120 km/h in freight traffic with the 
load per axle of 22,5 tonnes. It needs also to be noticed that in Poland the railway 
network has been systematically reduced. In 2000 the length of exploited railway was 
22560 km, with a density of 7.2 km/100 km, while in 2003 the length was reduced to 
20665 km. 
Future plans regarding this particular kind of transport are focused on improving and 
updating the rail network with a priority to those situated along European crossing 
routes like: 
• Tallin – Ryga – Trakiszki – Bialystok – Warsaw, with a branch line to Riga – 
Kaliningrad – Braniewo – Elblag (corridors I) – E 75, 
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• Berlin – Kunowice – Poznan – Warsaw – Terespol – Minsk – Moscow (corridors II) 
– E 20, 
• Berlin – Zgorzelec – Wroclaw – Katowice – Cracow – Przemysl – Lvov – Kiev 
(corridors III) – E 30, 
The priorities for modernization are for (Wasiak, 2004): 
• corridors III (Wroclaw – Opole – Katowice – Medyka), 
• corridors II (Kunowice – Poznan – Warsaw– Terespol), 
• corridors VI (Gdynia – Warsaw – Idzikowice – Zawiercie – Katowice – 
Zebrzydowice), 
• corridors I (Trakiszki - Bialystok – Warsaw), 
• corridors Ia (Tczew – Malbork – Bogaczewo – Braniewo), 
• Line (Wroclaw – Poznan – Krzyż i Stettin – Dabie – Swinoujscie), 
• new corridor Baltic Sea – Black Sea and line number 7 (Warsaw – Lublin – 
Dorohusk). 
In agreement with the Railway Commercialization, Restructuring and Privatization 
Law enacted in 2000, the state–owned enterprise Polish State Railway (PKP) has 
undergone a period of structural reform. PKP has been transformed into a commercial 
law company in order to try and obtain sufficient financing from external sources for 
investment projects. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Existing railways network in Poland. 
Source: E. Wysocka, System of Studies and Plans of Spatial Planning after Reform of Territorial 
Organisation of the Country, Institute of Spatial Management and Housing, Warsaw 2000. 
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3.2 Airports 
 
In recent years, air transport has been the more dynamic means of transport around 
the world and in Poland as well. The location and quality of airports is a crucial aspect 
for its development. The main Polish airports are located in : 
- 1 Central airport: Warsaw – Okęcie, 
- 7 Regional airports: Cracow – Balice, Gdańsk – Rębiechowo, Poznań, 
Pyrzowice k/ Katowic, Wrocław, Szczecin – Goleniów, Rzeszów, 
- 12 Regional airports with inferior signification, 
- 18 Local airports. 
 
Important changes have taken place. Private airports have been built, new companies 
offering the low cost flights between the attractive cities in Europe appeared in the 
market. These changes and the increasing travel habits among average income people 
explains the boom of the sector. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The creation of a modern transport infrastructure network in Poland is a strategic 
challenge for the Polish government. In 1998 the Polish Ministry of Transport prepared 
a project entitled “Transport Policy of the Country for 2000 – 2015. Years for Eco–
development” which examined the ways to create the necessary condition for the 
integration of the Polish transport network with the European countries network. This 
project also suggested possibilities for improving new technology for multimodal 
transport. To realize all plans, a substantial increased in financial resources is needed. 
The most likely sources of financing will be state funds, planned fuel payments, EU 
grants and credit from the international financial institutions. 
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Abstract 
 
This article aims to analyze the potential of Iranian ports for carrying some containerized cargo, from 
the Far East to the European Union, which is usually transported via traditional shipping routes. The idea 
of diverting cargo via an “Iran route” emerged from an examination of economic, trade and maritime 
transportation trends and events. This study presents a new idea for a freight route, designed in four 
segments for the benefit of the carrier. In order to make assumptions about the future in what are 
undisputedly widespread uncertain conditions, a scenario method has been employed. Following this a 
plausible future plan for a new terminal has been developed taking into account geographical, technical 
and economic themes for serving the container transit market until 2011. 
 
Keywords: Iranian ports; Container transit. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This article aims to analyse the potential role of Iranian ports for carrying a part of 
containerized cargo, which under present circumstances would be transported via 
‘traditional’ shipping routes. By considering the shorter Iranian route in linking the 
European Union and Asia in terms of time and cost in comparison with the traditional 
shipping route, the scenario of a ‘route via Iran’ is proposed. This scenario reflects a 
way to extend the global supply chain and accelerate integration of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) and Eastern European countries into the globalization 
process.  
Iran, as a historical transit route, could play a new role in the changing world. After 
1985 an increasing amount of containerized cargo has been transported between South 
East Asia and Western Europe. In this study, a scenario analysis was employed as a 
research tool to generate a ‘route via-Iran’ scenario. In order to generate such a scenario, 
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micro and macro economic events, and ports, shipping and hinterland trends were taken 
into account. At a later stage, economic benefits and costs of diverting a share of transit 
cargo via the Iran route will be assessed.  
The Iranian economy is very much dependent upon natural resources (in particular oil 
and gas) and therefore the degree of diversification is low. It is important for the country 
to search for opportunities and new ways to tackle its economic problems (manifested in 
high unemployment, an undiversified income source, and in a broad sense shortage of 
competitiveness) in order to establish itself as an important player in the global 
economy. The comparative advantages of an Iranian route, as opposed to the traditional 
ocean shipping route, are used as a theoretical basis to generate the scenario for this 
study. This scenario indicates that from a global perspective, it is possible to decrease 
costs and increase competitiveness due to the resulting shorter voyage time and 
consequent lower costs when using a transit route through Iran. This scenario leads to 
an assumption that because of Iran’s comparative advantages in the foreseeable future, 
the Far East-European transit business could become one of the major commercial 
services in the country. 
 
 
Research methodology 
 
Scenario planning was deployed as the principal research method. It was developed at 
the California Rand Corporation for military use after World War II, and then was 
adapted by Kahn in 1960s as a more general business tool. Its most prominent 
utilization was carried out by Wack and Newland at Royal Dutch/Shell in the 1970’s, 
when they examined the impact on oil prices in a number of potential scenarios. 
Van der Werff (1998) described scenario planning as a method which can provide 
answers to ‘What if...?’ questions when the circumstances involve important issues and 
large external influences. Unlike strategic planning, which postulates a single 
anticipated future, scenario planning looks at alternative versions of the future. The goal 
of scenario planning is to ‘enrich management's thinking, perceptions of reality, and 
modes of decision making when addressing important issues in the face of uncertainties’ 
(Van der Werff, 1998). Kahn (1965) as a pioneer of scenario planning defined it as 
‘hypothetical sequences of events constructed for the purpose of focusing attention on 
causal processes and decision points’ (p129).  
Kleiner (1995) added that ‘contrary to what many people believe about scenario 
exercises, their purpose is not prediction. You don’t predict what will happen: you posit 
several potential futures (…). A scenario planning exercise is a bit like a storytelling 
workshop, set up to bring forth distinction and phenomena that the conventional 
wisdom ignores’ (p275).  
A scenario can emerge through rational trends and events or be created by its 
variables and their outcomes under uncertain conditions. Generally, scenario creation 
consists of three main steps - scenario generation, scenario development and scenario 
contraction.  
In the first phase of scenario creation, the main developments of Iran’s economy, 
trade, shipping, ports and their hinterland are considered. They are identified as scenario 
variables. The scenario notes the sphere of changes and a range of possible futures. In 
the second phase, according to the long term and operational environments of the story, 
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some themes are deliberately exaggerated. These themes are usually derived using 
Finlay’s DEEPLIST (Demographic, Environment, Economic, Politics, Legal, 
Information, Social and Technology) method, which requires developing each theme 
through analyzing the present taken on into the future (Finlay, 2000). 
The scenario planning method has been used by many researchers in the field of 
transport research. Some examples include Banister (1998), Bavarsad (1997) and 
Darzentas (1996); they all applied scenario planning to model a transportation system. 
 
 
Scenario generation phase 
 
Global maritime supply chain factors 
 
It is quite clear that all transportation systems are affected by both internal and 
external factors. Internal factors affect the transportation system directly and include 
developments in transport technology, engine advancement, control systems, 
deregulation, containerization etc. External variables, which are most commonly 
dependent upon the global economy, are also very important and can have a very 
significant effect upon technological, social and integration concepts within the 
transportation system.  
In the maritime supply chain, both internal and external factors are equally important, 
because a seaport serves as a link between the shipping industry and the port’s 
hinterland. Both, the shipping infrastructure and the port hinterland are potential port 
customers and each is affected by forces in the national as well as the global economy. 
Scenario creation for the maritime transport sector is generally based upon this structure 
(Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Scenario creation for the maritime sector. 
Source: Authors.  
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Economic events and trends 
 
Globalisation and international trade 
 
Globalization as a term was developed in the industrial world and has stemmed from 
intense competition, because the omission of trade barriers, emerging multi-national 
companies and tendencies to sign regional agreements has led to intense competition 
among suppliers. As a result the movement of goods, information flows and financial 
operations has become an inseparable part of this process. Globalization means different 
things to different people. In its broadest sense, the term encompasses all types of 
economic and cultural transfers between nations – including domination of the media 
and widespread use of the World Wide Web. In a narrower sense, it refers to the 
economic exchange of goods and services internationally and international financial 
flows. Generally it could be said that globalization of economics has led to the 
construction of a world market. It also refers to the production and distribution of 
products and services of a homogeneous type and quality on a world-wide basis. 
During the past few decades, world trade has been growing faster than the world’s 
GDP, which implies that an increasing share of the world’s output crosses international 
borders (Oman, 1994). Meanwhile, trade barriers have declined substantially as a result 
of successive trade negotiation rounds under the auspices of the GATT/WTO, unilateral 
trade liberalization and regional trade agreements. Integration of economics and a high 
rate of interchange have led to the situation where the growth of world trade twice 
exceeds the world GDP growth (WTO, 2002). 
From 1955 until 2000, overall world export trade in merchandise increased almost 65 
times, from US$ 96 billion to US$ 6,243 billion and during the same period, overall 
manufacturers’ exports demonstrated a remarkable increase from US$ 41 billion to US$ 
4,630 billion (WTO, 2002). 
 
 
Introduction to the Iranian economy 
 
Iran’s economy is very much dependent upon crude oil and therefore each change in 
oil price is reflected in Iranian macroeconomic data. Such dependency (and in particular 
a fall in the price of oil) has led to a number of decisions to postpone development 
programmes, which were initially proposed by the Iranian Government. Approximately 
91% of Iran exports are natural resources and 75-80% (by value) of overall exports is 
oil. In 2004, by the order of Ayatollah Khamenayee (the target Leader of Islamic 
Republic of Iran), the Iranian Government prepared a strategic perspective for economic 
development, which promoted economic diversification in an attempt to reduce this 
single export product dependency.  
Other major concerns of the Iranian economy are unemployment and inflation. The 
official unemployment rate in 2004 was approximately 15-17% and the inflation rate 
14% (unemployment rate for youth, age 15-29 was approximately 31% and is 
anticipated to reach 50% in 2006). 
The Iranian transport sector has been performing well in all areas in recent years. For 
example, Shaheed Rejaee – a major container port, handled 1,151,989 TEU in 2003 and 
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it is expected that after a development programme is completed, the container capacity 
will reach 2.5 million TEU. Current trends also predict that the port will be able to 
handle 3.5 million TEU by 2010. Overall, Iranian ports attracted more ships in 2003, as 
they reduced their tariffs and improved their efficiency and performance levels. The 
current achievements confirm the positive development trends and increasing container 
capacity and transit expansion are setting high expectations for 2010 (see Figure 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Iran: Ports and Main Rail Links. 
Source: http://web.archive.org/web/20040211212148/www.irirw.com/erailinfo/maps/rainetwork.htm. 
 
 
The potential of the Iranian route for EU-ASEAN trade 
 
The European Union (EU) is the world’s greatest trade area in volume; in 2001, the 
EU’s share of world trade was 41.54% (US$ 1.2 billion). More than 60% of this was 
intra-EU trade but the international EU-world trade remained a significant proportion.  
As opposed to the long-established EU, the ASEAN region (Association of South 
East Asian Nations) emerged in 1967 and is a non-unitized trade area. The members are 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
The main income of ASEAN and ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, Korea) countries comes 
from manufactured goods and international trade. On its own, the ASEAN countries 
were responsible for 5% of all world trade in 2001; however ASEAN+3 constituted 
23% and 25% of world trade in 2001 and 2002 respectively (World Bank, 2003). The 
overall merchandise trade in 2001 between EU and ASEAN+3 was US$ 466 billion.  
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In May 2004 ten new countries joined the EU many from Eastern Europe, and 
because of resulting change in EU borders, the Iranian route has gained advantages over 
the traditional ocean shipping route. First of all, the change of borders made the average 
distance between Iran and the EU shorter and secondly, because industrial centres are 
likely to develop more quickly in the new East European member states of the EU, the 
cost of transportation from ASEAN to EU will decrease using an Iran transit route 
especially compared with the traditional shipping route. This process of industrial 
repositioning in the EU towards the eastern periphery will be exacerbated by the lower 
labour costs of the region and this in turn makes alternative Far East – EU transport 
links (including that via Iran) more viable. 
 
 
Transportation and maritime trends 
 
Transportation as a part of the integrated global supply chain is affected by many 
variables that lie both inside and outside the sector itself. The international trade 
environment is one of the most significant of these variables and with its continuous 
growth in recent years, the transport industry has experienced the need to supply ever 
increasing numbers and quality of services in all areas of the world. From the 
internationally exporting manufacturers’ point of view, transportation is an unavoidable 
part of the total manufacturing cost of their product. Considerable efforts are 
continuously made to reduce such costs, mainly because imported goods have to 
compete with locally manufactured goods not only in terms of quality but also perhaps 
more importantly, price. Nonetheless, the perception about transportation changed 
drastically during 1990s. A large number of logistics companies emerged, which 
provided not only transportation solutions, but also marketing, sourcing and other 
business supporting operations. Such companies started to offer value-added services in 
the supply chain and it was no longer viewed as a part of the production cost.  
The development of multimodal transportation and the formation of improved 
transport corridors can also be viewed as variables in the global supply chain. Numerous 
developments in transportation technology and industry’s need to introduce Just-In-
Time delivery services (JIT) raised the profile of multimodal transport solutions 
(Rodrigue, 2003). The formation of improved transportation corridors to enhance the 
capabilities of the transport industry to deliver JIT services was a consequence of 
developments during this period. 
In response, the ports and shipping industry found it necessary to react in order to 
improve their services and gain or retain business. Containerization became the leading 
edge within much of the maritime trade and developed rapidly in terms of capacity – 
vessels and terminals got bigger and more efficient within a relatively short period of 
time. The growth in capacity imposed new requirements upon the industry and a new 
type of collaboration emerged - mergers and strategic alliances (Evangelista and 
Morvillo, 1999). Shipping alliances control approximately 85% of container trade and 
are made up of all of the major liner shipping companies (Cario, 2002). These alliances 
link maritime and inland transportation systems creating economy of scale benefits. In 
turn this has meant that as container ships increased in size, they had access to only 
certain ports and this trend was exacerbated by the development of hub and spoke liner 
feeder systems with large vessels serving a few strategic ports and a number of smaller 
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vessels serving many other ports. The result was a division of ports into global hubs, 
regional hubs, sub-regional and local ports (World Bank, 2002), depending on their 
facilities and the hinterland they serve. In spite of what this classification suggests, each 
port still operates as a distribution centre (albeit of a different scale) within the global 
container supply chain.  
In this context, most of the container traffic from the ASEAN+3 countries passing to 
Europe is transported using traditional ocean shipping routes. However, the global 
supply chain network and the needs of modern JIT means that alternative arrangements 
for such cargo are continuously assessed in logistical terms and the Iranian route has 
been identified as having potential to re-route some of this traffic away from the 
traditional ocean shipping network, utilizing hub ports in Iran to trans-ship containers 
onto a multi-modal rail network with access to East Europe and the countries of the 
Former Soviet Union, possibly both at lower costs and in a shorter time (see Figure 2 
for main ports and rail links in Iran). 
 
 
Container trade 
 
Since 1990, container transportation growth has exceeded the growth of overall 
maritime trade (ESCAP/UNDP, 2001). In 2001 ESCAP published a long term Regional 
Shipping and Port Development Strategy, which predicted container trade developments 
until 2011. The world’s container throughput in 2011 is expected to be approximately 
122 million TEU and the distribution of the trade is presented in Table 1. The project 
stressed that Asia (South East and China) and Europe will be the most important regions 
in terms of container trade in the future and therefore will show the highest growth 
potential for long-distance container movements. 
In 1998, 4.18 million TEU were transported between the Far East and Europe, but by 
1999 the volume had increased to 4.25 million TEU. According to ESCAP, the 
container growth rate projection shows that total container traffic in 2011 on the 
traditional shipping route between Asia and Europe will reach 18 million TEU.  
 
Table 1: Distribution of container volumes in 2011. 
Region Market share 
Europe 22% 
North America 14% 
Latin America 7% 
Middle East 3% 
Africa 4% 
ANZ/Pacific 2% 
East Asia 23% 
North Asia 10% 
South East Asia 11% 
South Asia 4% 
Total 100% 
Sources: ESCAP (2001), Regional shipping and port development policy, p23. 
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With such a large growth in container movements forecast it is reasonable to presume 
that the opportunities for modal and route changes would also exist and in the light of 
this it is possible that some of this container traffic could be diverted to the rail-based 
Iranian route utilizing traditional shipping between the Far East and Iran and then rail 
links through Russia to access markets in the FSU and Eastern Europe. This would save 
considerable sailing distance by traditional ocean shipping routes passing through the 
Suez Canal and around the continent of Europe and as a consequence considerable 
costs. Table 2 presents some tentative indications of the potential for this route based 
around container handling capacity until 2011.  
 
Table 2: Potential container handling capacity of the Iranian route (million TEU). 
Year Europe-Asia Asia-Europe Total 
2004 5.93 5.83 11.76 
2005 6.23 6.21 12.53 
2006 6.73 6.61 13.34 
2007 7.13 7.01 14.14 
2008 7.56 7.43 15 
2009 8.01 7.87 15.88 
2010 8.5 8.34 16.86 
2011 9 8.85 17.85 
Sources: ESCAP (2001), Regional shipping and port development policy, pp20-24. 
 
 
Scenario development 
 
Iran is geographically situated in a strategic location mid-way within major East-West 
and North-South trade routes and is relatively close to the border of an enlarged EU, a 
factor given more emphasis by the prospect of entry of Bulgaria and Romania by 2008 
at the latest and Turkey some time after this. Iran therefore possesses the potential to 
provide a cheaper and quicker alternative to the traditional ocean-shipping based liner 
route from the Far East to Europe, and in this way diversifying and enhancing its own 
economy whilst also further integrating itself within the international global supply 
chain. 
The scenario is developed using a series of basic variables, which in this case consist 
of a number of inter-related themes that together form a future contextual environment 
for the Far East – Europe container trade and the route choice to be made within this. 
The dominant features of this scenario are those that are represented by the transport 
elements rather than the external variables that may have some impact. These were 
chosen as their influence upon the market is sizeable and it is the cost of transportation 
which forms one of the most significant influences upon route and modal choice 
(Banister, 2000). 
The most influential themes for this scenario are those related to the geographical, 
technical and financial/economy issues (Bavarsad, 1997). Geographical-based themes 
were developed in terms of costs and time required for cargo movement; technical 
themes related to the facility requirements; and the financial/economy themes were 
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developed in terms of costs of the construction/reconstruction of facilities required for 
cargo storage and movement.  
The Far East – European freight market can be divided into four sections for the 
purposes of analysis of the potential that the Iranian land route offers. This will provide 
the opportunity to make comparisons with the ocean shipping route which, apart from a 
small number of containers that travel by the Trans-Siberian Railway, dominates the 
market (Pasukeviciute et. al., 2005). 
The first section (shown as Segment 1 in Figure 3 – The Ocean Segment) can be 
defined as the stretch from the Malacca Strait (Singapore) to Bandar Abbas, the major 
Iranian container port located in the south of Iran. This section would only involve 
maritime transportation and apart from the port call in Iran, already constitutes the first 
stage of the existing shipping route. 
The second section – termed the ‘Iranian segment’ (Segment 2) is an inland route 
from the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas on the Indian Ocean to Amirabad, a port located 
on the coast of the Caspian Sea, in the north of Iran. Containers would be trans-shipped 
at Bandar Abbas and then transported using railway and road links across Iran.  
The third sector – termed the ‘Caspian Sea segment’ (Segment 3) would involve 
movement of containers by ship across the Caspian Sea, from Amirabad to Astarakhan 
or Lagan, both Russian ports on the north coast of the Caspian Sea. 
The fourth and final sector is the ‘European segment’ (Segment 4) and would involve 
land (rail and road) transportation from Astarakhan or Lagan to Eastern Europe and 
countries of the Former Soviet Union thus avoiding the long sea voyage through the 
Mediterranean and English Channel, or the shorter but still largely unnecessary trans-
shipment through South European ports such as Trieste and then onward movement by 
land. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Proposed Iran route for far East - European trade. 
Source: Map section from http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world_maps/world_pol_2004.pdf. 
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Spatial comparisons between the route options 
 
In terms of the spatial and economic issues, the alternative proposed Iranian route will 
now be compared with the traditional ocean shipping route which is used for the large 
majority of container movements at present, in order to assess its advantages in terms of 
both transportation time and cost. Table 3 presents the characteristics of both routes. It 
is important to note that a number of assumptions have been made in order to finalize 
the scenario; for example the distance in kilometres is provided assuming that cargo 
arriving via both routes is destined for the industrial regions of Eastern-Northern Europe 
which includes in particular the new Member States of the EU of the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia but excluding 
Cyprus and Malta as it is the East European region that offers most potential for the 
Iranian land route option. No attempt has been made to include the markets in the 
Former Soviet Union of central Asia, the Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus, Georgia or 
Moldova at this stage but their potential for being linked by this new routing should be 
noted. The opportunities afforded by Trans Siberian rail linkages should also be noted 
here as another alternative to the traditional ocean shipping route. 
Table 3: Comparison of the traditional shipping route and the Iranian route. 
 
 
 
Ship Size in 
TEU 
 
Average speed  
  
Cost   
(in US$) 
 
Length 
(km) 
 
Time 
(days) 
700-1,000 22.2 knots  200-700 6 Ocean segment 
1,200 24.2 knots  200-700 4,270 5 
Iranian segment      
Rail 27.3 km/h 210 3  
Road 
 
 60 km/h 600 1,795 1.5 
      
Caspian segment  Non container 
ship 
22 knots 600 1,250 1-2 
      
European segment      
 Rail x 41 km/h 520 4,369 5-6 
      
Total Iranian route      
Sea-Rail 1,530-2,030 16  
Sea-Road 
 
 
 
 1,920-2,420 11,684 14 
      
3,000-4,000 22.2 knots 1,370 20,250 27 Traditional shipping route 
4,000+ 24.2 knots 1,370 20,250 26 
Sources: Transit (2002), Iran Transit Symposium, TTO, Behnami Pub, pp68-72; Asadi, (2004), Director 
of Caspian Shipping Company, Interview; UNCTAD, (2002), Review of Maritime Transport 2002, p60. 
 
It can be clearly seen in Table 3, that the Iranian route has significant advantages in 
terms of transportation time and distance as it could reduce the journey time by up to 
40%. However under the present circumstances it is likely to be more expensive 
especially because it involves multi border-crossings. In terms of costs, in the longer 
term they could be reduced by implementing changes such as operating bigger container 
ships for the Far East – Iran, Ocean and Caspian Sea segments and upgrading port 
facilities to enable them to handle these larger ships. The latter would particularly relate 
to the Caspian Sea ports, where significant investment would be required but which 
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might be justified if the new Iranian route could attract sufficient container traffic from 
this market. It was estimated that the price per container transported via the Iranian 
route would drop from US$ 2,455 to US$ 1,855 (using rail transport only) and from 
US$ 2,895 to US$ 2,295 (using both – rail and road transport) if these vessel and port 
economies of scale were achieved. These cost economies were based upon an 
assumption of 4000TEU ships for the Caspian Sea section (as well as the Indian Ocean) 
and development of the container terminals in Amirabad and Astarakhan to handle the 
larger ships.  
 
 
Technical issues 
 
Container handling efficiency in ports depends on a large number of variables the 
majority of which are technically based although those associated with organizational 
and administrative issues should not be under-estimated.  
The technical issues which are important in terms of the proposed Iranian route focus 
in particular upon container port operations. There are main three phases following 
departure from the origin in the Far Eastern port. In the first phase cargo is shifted from 
ship to shore; in the second phase cargo is moved to a container apron; and in the third 
phase cargo is loaded onto the inland vehicle (truck or train). At the final destination, 
whichever route is used, there is of course a final transfer. In order to provide efficient 
services, the port requires modern gantry cranes for the first phase of the operation, 
quay(s) and apron space for the second, and some form of container crane/vehicle for 
the final stage. 
According to the World Bank survey of port infrastructure, Iranian ports need to have 
the following facilities for the future:  
 
• Quay length of 300-320m and port channel depth of 18-20m 
• Gantry crane performance of 35-45 moves per hour and 22 hours of operation 
daily (281,000-361,000 moves per year) 
• Total container waiting time in transit area less than 3 days 
• Trailer turnaround time less than 30 minutes 
• 4 to 5 gantry cranes with capacity of handling 800,000 TEU per year 
• Capacity to handle 5000 TEU ships 
 
These minimum requirements set the parameters for the proposed Iranian container 
landbridge link which this paper discusses.  
 
 
Capacity calculations for potential demand 
 
There were two possible scenarios considered in this case. First of all, in the case of 
10% of the potential transit cargo from the Far East to Europe handled through Iranian 
ports and then trans-shipped onto the Iranian route this would amount to approximately 
180,000 TEU per year at the current level of demand. Secondly, if demand for the 
Iranian route was to increase to a highly optimistic 50% this would amount to 900,000 
TEU per year. Table 4 presents calculations for the required facilities for this level of 
demand based on the World Bank standards noted above. 
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Table 4: Estimation of required facilities, based on potential demand. 
Potential demand  10% 50% 100% 
Cranes  20ft 6 28 56 
 40ft 3 14 28 
Quays  3 5 10 
Transtainers 20ft 18 84 168 
 40ft 9 42 84 
Trucks 20ft 60 280 560 
 40ft 60 280 560 
Source: Authors. 
 
 
Economic issues 
 
In this section the economic issues related to operating a specific container terminal 
largely dedicated to the Iranian route trade are calculated based on prices gathered from 
local and regional sources and the World Bank. Details are shown in Table 5 using the 
scenario assumptions made earlier. 
Table 5: Total cost estimation for a new Bandar Abbas container terminal (mUS$). 
Facilities 10% Market 
Share 
10% Market 
Share 
50% Market 
Share 
50% Market 
Share 
 20’ 40’ 20’ 40’ 
Quay (metres) 900 900 4500 4500 
Quay (cost)  140 140 700 700 
Gantry crane (number) 6 3 28 14 
Gantry crane (cost)  3.6 1.8 168.0 84.0 
Transtainer (number) 18 9 84 42 
Transtainer (cost)  7.2 3.6 33.6 16.8 
Other costs  100 100 150 150 
Truck costs 8.4 8.4 39.2 39.2 
TOTAL 291.6 270.0 1090.8 990.0 
Source: Authors. 
 
Meanwhile further calculations were aimed at assessing the transport costs of the new 
route and were based upon a number of additional assumptions to those made earlier: 
 
• In terms of the Ocean segment (Far East – Bandar Abbas), Iranian interests have 
a serious chance of gaining some of the income from this segment in addition to 
benefits from cargo handling in Bandar Abbas. 
• The port operation part of the Caspian Sea segment will be undertaken entirely 
by Iranian interests but the shipping element might be undertaken by a non-
Iranian party. 
• Within the Iranian segment, all activities will be undertaken by Iranian interests. 
 
Table 6 show the operational costs for each segment based upon these assumptions 
and from this, plausible income scenarios can be derived. Table 7 shows these income 
scenarios transporting a TEU using the Iran route. 
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Table 6: TEU Cost for the Iranian scenario route (US$ per TEU). 
Route 
Segment Caspian Sea Segment Iranian Segment Ocean Segment 
Operation Shipping Port Rail Road Shipping Port 
Cost (US$) 250 100 210 650 450 100 
Source: Authors. 
 
Table 7: Estimation of total income for the Iranian scenario route (US$ per TEU). 
Caspian Sea Segment Iranian Segment Ocean Segment 
 
Shipping Port Rail Road Shipping Port 
 250 100 210 650 450 100 
Total Income 
Minimum 
Income 0 100 210 650 0 100 410 850 
Maximum 
Income 250 100 210 650 450 100 1110 1550 
Source: Authors. 
NB. Shaded cells refer to a 20’ container. 
 
 
 
The total Iranian Route scenario income can now be derived from the potential 
demand that has been identified. Here the calculations are based upon each of the 
previous assumptions with the results displayed in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Total income of scenario based on each portion of potential demand. 
Maximum  
(million US$) 
Minimum  
(million US$) Potential Demand (Mln TEU) 
2790 1998 1530 738 1.8 10% Potential Demand 
13950 9990 7650 3690 9 50% Potential Demand 
Source: Authors. 
NB. Shaded cells refer to a 20’ container. 
 
 
The total Iranian Route scenario income, assuming 10% of containers are diverted 
from the traditional ocean shipping route, is US$738-1530 million (minimum) rising to 
a maximum of US$1998-2790 million. The minimum expected revenue following a 
10% container diversion would be US$ 1134million, US$ 2394million maximum, 
taking the mean of the calculations as the most likely outcome. 
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Scenario obstacles 
 
For each scenario a number of practical obstacles could be identified. In this final 
phase of scenario planning these issues are considered under the categories of 
geographical, technical, economic and methodological. 
 
 
Geographical obstacles 
 
These are summarised in Table 9 with obstacles to the development of the Iranian 
Route divided into the geographical segments identified earlier. 
 
 
Technical obstacles 
 
A number of technical weaknesses can be identified. In particular these can be 
associated with the performance of Iranian port terminals in terms of capacity and 
productivity. 
 
 
Economic obstacles 
 
These particularly focus upon uncertainties in stability in Iranian financial sources. 
These issues stem in particular from the country’s economic dependency upon natural 
resources – in other words oil. There has also been a lack of transportation infrastructure 
investment for many years which needs to reposition the country within the global 
supply chain. 
 
Table 9: Geographical obstacles to the Iranian route. 
Segment Weaknesses Reasons 
Ocean Segment High cost of maritime 
transportation. 
No large container ships serving the segment. 
Low efficiency performance of Iranian ports. 
An imbalance of ship capacity on the line. 
Currently no Iranian port of call by the liner 
alliances. 
Iranian Segment Insufficient capacity and 
quality of Iranian land 
transportation. 
No high speed cargo train. 
High average age of technical facilities both 
by rail and road. 
Caspian Segment Low performance of 
ports. 
Lack of container terminal facilities and 
appropriate vessels. 
European Segment Low capacity of some 
segments of the route. 
Single track rail for some segments of route. 
Rail gauge incompatibilities. 
Multi-border crossing.  
Source: Authors. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Iranian economy can grow and diversify by identifying and utilising the 
opportunities which are increasingly offered by the process of global change. Long held 
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comparative advantages no longer can be seen as permanent and there has been a 
notable move towards dynamic advantage in international supply chain management. 
The Iranian economy can take advantage of these changes by planning to enter the Far 
East - European container transport market and acting as a landbridge as an alternative 
to the shipping route through the Suez Canal and Mediterranean Sea. 
Scenario planning as a strategic tool can help decision-makers to plan for the future 
helping them use their creativity for picturing possible alternative solutions. The 
scenario presented in this paper would aid the Iranian national economy to overcome a 
number of obstacles some related to economic diversification, others associated with 
integrating modern supply chain management processes into the country and facilitating 
the exploitation of Iran’s landbridge geographical position. Only 10% of the potential 
demand for this route would create revenues up to 30% of total non-oil exports. There is 
a great opportunity for Iran in this growing market but one so far which they have failed 
to gain access to. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper deals with the phenomenon of Complacency which is one of the causes of human error 
detected in the domain of ship accidents. The term Complacency is present as an influential social and 
psychological factor which has similar cause in shipping and port commercial operations. The causes of 
ship accidents from the aspect of Complacency are defined as Management Complacency, Leadership 
Complacency and Self-Induced Complacency. All of these causes are reflected as causes of accidents in 
ports at the management and operational level. The main domain in which Complacency is present as 
influential element is decision-making process as well as in ship and port commercial operations. 
 
Keywords: Ship accidents; Decision-making process; Port operations. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Commercial and economic demands between different areas and continents are 
mostly satisfied by maritime transport. (Economic and Social Committee of the 
European Communities, 1986; Ross, 1998) This gives rise to mutual connections and 
conditionality of technological and organisational components between ships as 
transporting vehicles on one hand, and ports as start and finish in the maritime transport 
on the other. Besides, it is important to keep in mind that ports should be considered as 
one of the most vital aspects of a national transport infrastructure. For most trading 
nations they are the main transport link with their trading partners and thus a focal point 
for motorways and railway systems. At the same time they are major economic 
multiplier for the nation's prosperity as well as commercial infrastructure in the form of 
banks, agencies and industrial activity. Ports should also be considered as one of the 
most important aspects of maritime transport because they are the location where most 
maritime accidents happen usually in shallow water, where ships converge. Accidents in 
the vicinity of ports and terminals often cause disastrous ecological consequences (e.g. 
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Exxon Valdez, United States. Congress. Senate. National Ocean Policy Study. and 
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation. 
Subcommittee on Merchant Marine, 1989) and numerous human victims (e.g. Herald of 
Free Enterprise). Besides, this is the place where most costs are incurred because much 
of the extra cost and delay occurs in ports (International Labour Office and International 
Maritime Organization, 2004). 
 
 
2. Managing safety at sea – Present status and tendencies 
 
Safety at sea in the conditions of modern maritime transport assumes an increasingly 
significant place in the process of transport by sea. Standards of maritime safety, among 
other things, are considered and adopted by the International Maritime Organisation – 
IMO as a specialized institution of the United Nations.(International Maritime 
Organization. 1990) The standards related to maritime safety, successfulness of 
navigation as well as prevention and supervision of oil pollution from ships are 
proposed by 158 IMO member countries. Furthermore, IMO makes efforts to establish 
collaboration among Governments as for all kinds of technical matters related to 
maritime affairs in international commerce. IMO consists of the Assembly, Council, 
Secretary and five Committees: Maritime Safety Committee, Marine Environment 
Protection Committee, Legal Committee, Technical Cooperation Committee and 
Facilitation Committee. Maritime Safety Committee – MSC – is competent for the area 
of maritime safety. Among other issues in this domain it deals with maritime accidents, 
i.e. any subject having direct influence on the safety of navigation. The work of the 
IMO consists of reaching decisions some of which, the most important ones, are 
compiled into international conventions. Such conventions are mandatory for all the 
IMO member countries. In the future IMO is not expected to issue new conventions but 
to apply the enacted documents and to  
To date international conventions which are important for the safety at sea are: 
• Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea – SOLAS, 1974; 
• Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 
COLREGS 1972; 
• International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships – MARPOL 
1978; 
• International Convention on Load Lines, LOADLINE 1966; 
• International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, TONNAGE 1969; 
• International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, SAR 1978. 
The above mentioned Conventions contribute to the safety at sea as well as to 
environment protection. What is characteristic and common to all the Conventions is the 
reason for their compilation and adoption. Namely, each Convention is based on a 
previous maritime accident whose causes were found out and whose consequences were 
significant to the extent of initiating the formulation and adoption of regulations and 
decisions, i.e. conventions. For instance, SOLAS Convention was issued at the 1914 
session instigated by the British Government on the occasion of sinking of Titanic in 
1912. Then, on the occasion of sinking of RO-RO passenger ship Herald of Free 
Enterprise in 1987 Chapter II – I, regulations 23-2 and 42-1 of SOLAS Convention 
were supplemented in 1988. Next, there came MARPOL Convention that was preceded 
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by the grounding of the tanker Torrey Canyon in 1967. Generally speaking, the 
significance of an accident as for making regulations that in future should act 
preventively is not characteristic of IMO only but can also be applied to single countries 
which on the occasion of accidents in their territorial waters enacted internal laws on 
future prevention. Such an example are the USA which after the grounding of the tanker 
Exxon Valdez in Alaska in 1989 brought in 1990 the Oil Pollution Act – OPA. What is 
more, this Act imposed more rigorous standards on the building of tankers than 
MARPOL Convention. 
However, such an approach to preventing further accidents with similar or identical 
causes has not proved efficient. In that sense, a need was felt for further insight into 
causes of maritime accidents on the basis of which shared basic cause–effect 
relationships would be found out.(Reason 1999) Results of investigations have focused 
on unsatisfactory efficiency of shipping companies with regard to the safety of work on 
board and environment protection during exploitation of ships. An accent was put on the 
effect of incorrectly defined or even non-existent working procedures in ordinary 
circumstances and emergencies. The result was issuing of International Safety 
Management Code – ISM that along with the introduction of ISO Standards on board 
and in the companies was supposed to eliminate the spotted incompatibilities. The Code 
was reinforced in the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watch-keeping – STCW in 1995 which has obliged all the member countries, 
shipping companies and seamen training institutions. As it became evident from later 
accidents, neither the ISM Code nor the introduction of ISO Standards were not enough 
to remove the possibility of the occurrence of accidents. This can be proved by the 
collision of ships Norwegian Dream and Ever Decent in 1999. Both ships complied with 
all the regulations of the SOLAS Convention and ISM Code but still they collided in 
conditions of good visibility and calm sea. (International Maritime Organization. 2004) 
It was this accident that emphasized the formerly noticed but not enough accentuated 
and investigated elements of human error. Namely, it was to be admitted that auditors of 
effectiveness of the ISM Code and ISO Standards implementation except for efficient 
examination of ship procedures could not cover the area of personal experience or 
influence communication, organisation, sociological and psychological relations within 
and between different cultural groups on board. It has been noticed that each of the 
above mentioned areas could initially set in motion a chain of errors made by 
crewmembers that finally brings to an accident. In that sense, we are dealing with 
human error due to fatigue and tiredness, inappropriate communication, unsuitable 
equipment handling technology as well as other kinds of influences among which the 
most significant are influences of the shipping company to ship organisation and 
influence of ship management style. 
 
 
3. Complacency – Basic concept and operational influences 
 
A recent approach to the analysis of maritime accidents accentuates some basic 
prerequisites for the occurrence of human error in the form of spotted lack of free 
communication and cooperation not only within ship organisation but also in its relation 
to external factors, especially shipping companies. It is the inappropriate 
communication along with deficient cooperation both on board and in the relation of 
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ship to external factors that represents one of the basic causes of reaching improper 
decisions and taking inefficient actions. (Maxwell 1976; Curtis 1991; Fukuda 1992; 
Emmott 2003) 
The genesis of inappropriate communication and poor cooperation follows both from 
the model of ship organisation and management style as well as from special and 
complementary socio-psychological influences. Such influences are witnessed on board 
and have direct influence on the quality of management.(Fahlgen 2000) 
After the analysis of causes and consequences of maritime accidents three areas were 
recognized in the domain of decision making and putting into practice that can have 
essential influence on safety and management style. They are: 
• The negative influence of the shipping company (Management) expressed 
through the dominant communication company – ship in which process the crew 
meet the interests of the company against their own beliefs and attitudes which 
are eventually lost, become passive or transform into submissive attitudes – 
Management Complacency. As a socio-psychological phenomenon Management 
Complacency occurs in conditions of inappropriate communication between 
ship’s crew and Management – shipping company. As for information exchange 
this form of communication emphasizing the dominating role of Management 
corresponds to a bad relationship between parent and child. In such relationships 
the crew feels criticized, controlled, insignificant, not given a hearing by the 
Management and with constant feeling of possible repression. This view is 
supported by the examples of not reducing the ship’s speed in order to maintain 
the ETA which were incompatible with weather and traffic conditions and in 
certain cases with technical conditions (e.g. Titanic, Estonia, Herald of Free 
Enterprise, Norwegian Dream) but which came out of the urge to please the 
Company, i.e. out of the influence of Management Complacency through the 
Master’s and Officers’ submissiveness. 
• The negative influence of leadership expressed through domination in which 
case the crew meets the requirements of the authority suppressing personal 
attitudes and beliefs – Leadership Complacency. In that sense, the Master with 
his behaviour formed eventually into attitude can unconsciously create an 
atmosphere in which the crew feels tense and uncomfortable. His relation to the 
crew can be dominant, intolerant and repressive while the crew feels criticized 
and unimportant. In such a climate the crew no longer support the Master by 
their knowledge and experience; what is more, their knowledge and experience 
are suppressed in circumstances arisen from the Master’s wrong decisions or 
omissions. Relations built in this manner can extend so far that a crewmember, 
for instance, follows the Master’s mistaken action with pleasure without 
undertaking anything at all. This can be traced in the analysis of maritime 
accidents in the majority of which the respective crew acted exclusively 
according to the Master’s decisions even on the occasions which pointed to the 
danger and the urge of taking action or measures contrary to those taken by the 
Master(ROTHBLUM 2000). The tankers Torrey Canyon, Amoco Cadiz and 
Erica are clear examples of the effect of Leadership Complacency. Another 
proof of what has been discussed above is disorganisation in case of the 
Master’s failure at the commanding and organisational levels (e.g. Oceanos) 
when the panic-stricken crew started abandoning ship due to the lack of 
information and direct commands leaving the passengers to their destiny. 
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• The negative influence of the acquired feeling of superiority and personal 
significance to the change of personal, previously positive attitudes – Self-
Induced Complacency. For example, a Chief Officer who satisfies all the 
requirements to become the ship’s Master is not promoted even after many years 
of irreproachable career while his colleagues with the same qualifications have 
already been filling such a post for some time. In that sense, there are two 
possible ways of reaction. A mature and realistic Chief Officer will carry on 
doing his best and applying his knowledge and experience in a professional way. 
A less mature and less realistic Chief Officer will start behaving contrary to 
what would be expected from his knowledge and skills and will not maximize 
his efforts as regards the safety of navigation. Such a reaction is a form of 
protest against the non-appreciation of his skills, knowledge and experience. 
Adopting such a dangerous form of behaviour he unconsciously satisfies his 
vanity and compensates his unrealised ambition in a wrong way. Such a form of 
behaviour is qualified as Self-Induced Complacency. In the analysis of maritime 
accidents it is possible to apply the notion of Self-Induced Complacency to the 
Second Officer of Admiral Akhimov that collided with Pyotr Vasev. At the time 
of the accident the Officer has already been filling the post for 25 years so that it 
is hard to believe that he was not familiar with collision regulations. 
From the above mentioned a conclusion can be reached that Complacency can lead to 
accidents with serious consequences. This phenomenon has been explained by Wiener 
from the University of Miami as follows: “Complacency can strike any person in any 
occupation, where a person feels his skill, knowledge and his experience are called into 
question by superiors. And the result will most likely be changed attitudes caused by 
gradually hampered creativity.” 
In that sense, shipping and ports are brought under common denominator related to 
the risks of occurrence of accidents caused among other things by human error arising 
partly from wrong attitudes and bad work habits due to the influence of Complacency. 
This is even more true as most port workers have previous experience on board ships 
which they spontaneously transferred to administrative and operative work in the port. It 
follows that safety in port regarding acquired attitudes and work habits shown through 
decision making and acting of those who work in ports is in many ways similar to safety 
on board. 
 
 
4. Complacency as influential element on port organisation and principal functions 
 
Ports, like most other commercial activities, are constantly changing. Cargo-handling 
technology and changes in labour requirements and culture have also evolved. In 
accordance with those requirements a significantly smaller but better trained workforce 
was needed. During all this changing, ports are constantly trying to maximise cargo 
throughput or minimise its cost that means maximising the profit. This is a very well 
known concept of shipping companies whose goals are to maximize the turnover of 
ships with minimum cost and maximum benefit. That is the magic circle in which, from 
the aspect of ports, many groups and interests are involved and port management and 
administration tend to become too large and complex. In these circumstances port 
management operates under great many tight constraints. All the external constraining 
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groups like shippers, ship owners, trade unions, environmentalists, local area authorities 
and national government will be putting pressure on the port management to satisfy 
their needs (see figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Constraining influences on port management. 
 
Constraining influences on port management are connected mainly to far-reaching 
political decisions, either at national or at regional level. In circumstances as those 
mentioned above scenario for complacency is very wide. For example, in 1998 the 
results of an international survey covering 1000 reports from ships and terminals were 
published. The reports covered 222 terminals in 46 different countries. Most of the 
problems reported by ships and terminals were related to the breakdown of 
communication and mutual understanding. Some 30% of ship reports considered the 
terminal interface unsatisfactory and frequently there was no terminal representative on 
site with authority to accept responsibility or make decisions. A common complaint 
from ships was «loading was too fast and we had to leave with our ballast on board». 
This shows that operational level at those terminals which is responsible for tactical 
decisions was related to everyday operations and that connected to port functions such 
as shipping companies, stevedoring companies and freight – forwarders was 
unorganised and sloppy.(Applied Systems Institute., United States. Office of Port and 
Intermodal Development. et al. 1981; International Labour Office. and International 
Maritime Organization. 2004) Constraining influences on management level together 
with poor tactical decisions on operational level affect support level that is associated 
with tasks carried out by different government agencies or private enterprises. 
Analysing this report (Patric 1999)it is very easy to notice that breakdown of 
communication and mutual understanding along with absence of terminal representative 
and authority show presence of leadership complacency. Furthermore, the consequences 
of such a behaviour are visible from an analysis of oil spill accidents between 1974 and 
1990. The report indicates that over 70% of those accidents occurred in port during 
loading and discharging operations, and further 12% were from ships in port that were 
engaged in bunkering operations. This means that positive initiative of workers on 
operational level was low because in many cases they only did what their superior or 
management expected of them to do. Positive initiative means that they could do 
something against the spillage in time, but they did not because they followed the orders 
based on routine or inadequate procedures. The absence of initiative is another evidence 
of the presence of complacency based mainly on leadership. Bad communication 
between ship’s mates and terminal operator, as quoted in Lloyd's List in August 1998 
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for a large container ship loading in the Far East, indicated that around 10% of changes 
in the stowage plan were necessary, mostly in the latter stages of loading. Such last-
minute changes can cause serious problems for ship's stability, and especially Chief 
Mate, because container ships are very sensitive to any changes in top weight. So, that is 
again a case of misunderstanding between ship and terminal management because of the 
lack of communication and tendencies of the terminal to «fill up» the ship with cargo at 
any cost. This shows the presence of Management Complacency because the attitude of 
efficient loading, which means profit, was not followed by safety.  
However, there are other factors that have to be considered to understand the tensions 
between management, operational and support levels in ports, or between ship's officers 
and terminal operators that commonly lead to some kind of complacency. Mainly, that 
depends on port organisation that can be hierarchical or matrix.(United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. Secretariat. and United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development. 1985) Hierarchical or functional organization is usually 
present in ports under direct government control. It means that national government or 
regional authorities more often than not assumed a role of supreme authority to port 
authorities. The ports in which private sector participates in the ownership usually have 
matrix organizational structure. In this matter centralized decision-making is 
characteristic of ports under direct government control. Otherwise, shared decision-
making is present in ports in which private sector dominates. From this point of view it 
is easy to conclude that complacency in any form can occur much more often in ports 
with centralised government control and typical hierarchical structure, which mean 
centralized decision-making, than in ports with private sectors. This conclusion can in a 
way be supported by a statement of the Editor of Port Development International in 
1992 who wrote: «For too long the inefficiencies and excesses of the dockers have been 
mirrored by top-heavy administrations - over-manned, under-talented and equally 
obdurate to change». In general, the trend worldwide, in Europe, China, Africa, Asia, 
etc., is to decentralise direct government control and to place the port on a more 
commercial footing. This is indicated by a survey conducted by F.R. Harris in the late 
1980s in which around 80% of ports replied that private sector participation was 
increasing. For example, in 1983 ABP (Associated British ports) consisting of 19 UK 
ports was privatised with most employees owning at least 1000 shares. Since then, 
labour productivity has increased by 40%. But it would be exaggerated to conclude that 
complacency depends on the type of port ownership only. 
From the aspect of complacency, a port is not a coherent entity like a ship but a loose 
collection of trading activities within a fairly arbitrary boundary. This makes it more 
difficult to theorise about how and when complacency will cause an accident. For 
example, a subject included in the support level such as Vessel Traffic Service – VTS 
can operate as active and passive VTS. Active VTS operates in such a way that within a 
defined area the VTS traffic controller regulates the conduct of vessels in accordance 
with port or regional legislation. With passive VTS the person in charge has only the 
role of traffic advisor informing the vessels in the area of current traffic movements and 
of any unusual circumstances. Most ports have a traffic control centre operated by 
experienced and qualified mariners who are able to observe the movement of all vessels 
within the port by enhanced radar and video presentation. All these facts are supported 
by the IMO Resolution A 857- Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Service adopted in 
November 1977. In this resolution the IMO defines VTS as «traffic monitoring service 
which is implemented by a competent authority, designed to improve safety and 
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efficiency of vessel traffic and to protect the environment». This competent authority 
could be a «governmental maritime organisation, single port authority, pilot 
organisation or any combination of these». All these measures are not enough from the 
aspect of complacency. Complacency strikes from the inside and can avoid all these 
measures. It means that complacency will occur as human error from the weakness of 
the system – man in charge of VTS. As it has been written before, mariners can move 
from ship to other duties, such as VTS controller, but they retain mariner 
communication habits and way of thinking. The real question that is important for safety 
within a VTS area is which kind of organizational experience the controller has from 
previous ship service. If he served under shipping company that has reflected 
management complacency for many years, it means that this person still has the routine 
of compliance. So, how compliance resulting from complacency can cause an accident 
within a VTS area is clearly visible from the case of the tanker Exxon Valdez in 1989. 
In this case the VTS controlling Prince William Strait on the Alaska Marine Terminal 
tacitly accepted the information from the Master of Exxon Valdez that he intended to 
sail outside the separation scheme because of the presence of ice. In these circumstances 
VTS could not follow the ship movement on the radar screen. The VTS did not protest 
against the action of the Master of Exxon Valdez. It was clear evidence that VTS in this 
area suffered from management complacency because all the staff tacitly supported 
compliance to Exxon company that owned the tanker Exxon Valdez. 
Complacency can be recognized from other entities as common cause of errors in 
ports. An example is the grounding of the tanker Sea Empress on February 22, 1996. 
The UK Environmental Agency commenced criminal prosecutions against Milford 
Haven Port Authority and Milford Haven Harbour Master. The Milford Haven Port 
Authority was accused because it failed to regulate navigation within the harbour 
properly and failed to provide proper pilot service. The Harbour Master was also 
accused because he failed to take safety precautions and measures to regulate shipping 
at the entrance to and within the port. The Marine Accident Investigation Report found 
that the immediate cause was pilot error caused by inadequate training and experience. 
The real question is: “Are accidents necessary to find out a person’s inexperience and 
poor training?” Somebody had known before that this person is not experienced enough 
and that he needed more training. So, that is the problem of leadership complacency in 
the organization of Port Authority and self-induced complacency from the aspect of 
Harbour Master. The result of these forms of complacency is that in January 1999 the 
port of Milford Haven was fined 4 million pounds sterling arising out of these charges.  
If we compare accident like this one with some accidents on board ship it is possible 
to conclude that compatibility of interests among entities within port environment is 
much lower than among on board departments. Maritime accidents as an outcome of 
human error bear negative consequences to all participants (company and its 
shareholders, master, crew and environment) while misconduct of one of the entities 
operating within port limitations may be significant advantage to its competitor or even 
other entities; of course, some actions can bear negative consequences to all entities. 
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5. Possible measures to prevent negative impacts of complacency in port operations 
 
As it has been mentioned earlier in this paper the problem of complacency in general 
is problem of improper communication. Traditional hierarchical relationship with 
emphasised subordination and centralized decision-making is fundamental condition for 
affirmation of any kind of complacency. Therefore, no mariner should be employed in 
port if he suffers from complacency from the very beginning The measures against this 
phenomena are content of the team work and principles of matrix organization. Shared 
decision-making based on trust and mutual understanding lead any port entity to a 
common goal and that is efficiency. That means optimum use of resources within an 
acceptable context of safety that is reasonable starting point for efficiency. So, the 
starting point would be team building inside any port entity and between entities. The 
way from the beginning of team building to mature team is not short and needs three to 
four years. During this period commercial efficiency of the port will grow slowly but 
with fewer accidents. Any team needs this time to reach optimum work capability. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Complacency is conceptually communication phenomenon which can evolve in any 
organization where the relationship among employees are based on domination of 
superiors and hierarchical organization. Thus, complacency starts as an unconscious 
reaction to bad communication or unpleasant environment. Behaviour is then changed 
and finally the person's attitude is completely changed. When the process is finished, the 
person falls into a state where he or she unconsciously no longer uses available 
knowledge and resources. From the aspect of port as a complex and dynamic 
organization, complacency can cause serious problems and financial loss. The main 
problem with complacency is that it starts unconsciously and the complacent employee, 
for example a VTS controller, port pilot, harbour master etc., does not realize possible 
dangerous circumstances and how to correct them. 
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